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IL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
In 2005, the District Court sentenced Sarah Johnson, then a juvenile, to two fixed life 
terms of imprisonment with a fifteen-year gun enhancement. She had been convicted following a 
jury trial of killing her parents. 
The State could not produce DNA or fingerprint or blood evidence which connected 
Sarah to her parents' murders. However, the State did collect a great deal of DNA evidence 
which points to an unknown male or males who left his/their body tissue on the robe worn during 
the murders and blood on the rifle used for the murders. In addition, the killer or killers left other 
DNA evidence behind, including on a spent shell casing, the barrel of the rifle, inside the gloves 
the State associated with the murder and in other places which can now be tested and analyzed 
with techniques not available at the time of the trial. Sarah seeks testing of this evidence to 
establish her innocence. 
While J.C.§ l 9-4902(b)-(g) provide for DNA testing in cases like Sarah's, where identity 
was at issue, the evidence has been subject to a sufficient chain of custody, the result of testing 
has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show it is more probable 
than not that she is innocent, and the testing will produce admissible results under the Rules of 
Evidence, the District Court denied testing. The Court concluded, that even though the testing 
could reveal the source of the DNA on the robe, gun, spent shell casing, and in other relevant 
places, knowing the source would not prove that the source was the killer. The Court further 
concluded that because the jury convicted Sarah knowing that not all the DNA had been tested 
and knowing that none that was tested was Sarah's, Sarah can never meet the burden of showing 
that testing has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show it is more 
probable than not that she is innocent. 
The question before this Court is whether DNA testing can ever be allowed in any case. 
Because, under the District Court's analysis in Sarah's case, in order to get testing, a petitioner 
must first prove, without being able to test the DNA. who contributed the DNA and orove that - - ,• ... 
he/she was the killer; moreover, such proof can never be made if the petitioner has previously 
been convicted by a jury that was aware that there was untested DNA at the scene. If this is in 
fact the standard petitioners must meet to be granted testing, then testing is simply unavailable 
and LC. § 19-4906 is meaningless. 
In the second issue before this Court, Sarah seeks relief from the summary dismissal of 
several of her claims because they were raised in a successive petition. Sarah recognizes that 
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), decided during the pendency of her post-
conviction case, overruled Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P .2d 955 (1981 ). However, 
she maintains that she has raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether she was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and Idaho Constitution Article I,§ 13, as pied in the second, third, and fourth 
causes of action in her amended petition. ON A R pp. 111-13 5. She further maintains that she 
has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was denied due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Article I, § 13, when the State 
withheld material exculpatory evidence that fingerprints found on the rifle, scope, and 
ammunition box insert had been run through AFIS and matched to Christopher Hill. DNA R pp. 
135-138. The District Court dismissed these claims based upon Murphy, supra. Sarah does not 
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waive these claims. To the contrary, she asks this Court to overrule Murphy and remand these 
claims because Murphy was wrongly decided and is an unwise relinquishment of state 
sovereignty over state cases. 
Lastly, Sarah also sought post-conviction relief because the two juvenile fixed life 
sentences procedurally and substantively violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment. She asks this Court to conclude under Miller v. Alabama, _ 
U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), that her sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because, 
among other reasons, instead of treating her age as a mitigating factor, the sentencing court 
actually treated her age as an aggravating factor. 
B. Procedural history 
At age sixteen, Sarah, with no history of violence or lawbreaking of any sort, was accused 
of murdering her parents, Alan and Diane. Following a jury trial, she was convicted and 
sentenced to two fixed life terms with a fifteen-year firearm enhancement. DNA R p. 5; R 1 Vol. 
1, pp. 14-16; State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970,972, 188 P.3d 912,914 (2008). 1 
Despite Sarah's request for an appeal, trial counsel failed to timely file. R 1 Vol. 1 pp. 
32-33. Consequently, this Court dismissed the appeal. R 1 Vol. 1, pp. 207-08. 
Sarah filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R 1 Vol. 1, pp. 14-27. The District Court 
1 In this brief, the trial clerk's record is referred to as "TR;" the trial transcript is referred 
to as "T Tr.;" the trial exhibits are referred to "T Ex.;" the post-conviction clerk's record from the 
initial post-conviction case is referred to as "RI;" the transcript from the initial post-conviction 
case is referred to as "EH 1 Tr.;" the exhibits from the initial post-conviction case are referred to 
as "PC I Ex.;" the clerk's record from this DNA and successive post-conviction case is referred 
to as "DNA R;" the transcript from this DNA and successive post-conviction case is referred to 
as "DNA Tr." and the exhibits from this DNA and successive post-conviction case are refened to 
as "DNA Ex.'' The District Court took judicial notice of all prior proceedings. DNA Tr. 3/2/15 
p. 5, In. 11-25. 
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found ineffective assistance in the failure to file a timely notice of appeal and re-entered the 
judgment while staying consideration of the remaining claims. R l Vol. I, pp. 212-218. 
Sarah filed a timely notice of appeal from the re-entered judgment. However, appellate 
relief was denied. State v. Johnson, supra. 
Post-conviction proceedings resumed; however, the District Court denied relief. Sarah 
appealed. Johnson v. State. 156 Idaho 7,319 P.3d 419 (2014). 
While that appeal was pending, Sarah filed the DNA and successive petition at issue here. 
DNA R pp. 3-83.2 Sarah then filed an amended petition. DNA R pp. 99-159. Shortly, after that 
filing, the Supreme Court denied relief in the original post-conviction appeal. Johnson v. State, 
supra. 
Sarah raised the following claims in the amended DNA and successive petition: 
1) A request for DNA testing of evidence secured in her trial which was not 
subject to the testing now being requested because the testing was not available at 
the time of trial. 
2) Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment and 
Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 13 in: 
A) failing to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), following the 
State's denial of due process in discarding the comforter from the 
Johnsons' bed; 
B) failing to present evidence regarding Janet Sylton's parole status 
at the time of the Johnsons' murders; 
C) failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct through the trial; 
2 Counsel originally filed the DNA and successive petition under the same case number as 
the original petition. The District Court later assigned the case a new number and filed the 
petition nunc pro tune to the original date of filing. DNA R pp. 160-161. 
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D) failing to object to the jury's trip from Ada County to Bellevue, 
Idaho, to visit the Johnson house. 
3) Denial of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment 
and Idaho Constitution Art. I, § 13 under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 
104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984), as her counsel labored throughout the proceedings under 
an actual conflict of interest; 
4) Denial of effective assistance on direct appeal as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment and Idaho Constitution Art. L § 13 in: 
A. Failing to raise on appeal the District Court error in denying the 
motion to suppress the testimony of Malinda Gonzales; 
B. Failing to raise on appeal that the fixed life sentences were both 
excessive and unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and Idaho Constitution Art. I,§ 6. 
5) Denial of due process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Idaho 
Constitution Art. I, § 13 when the State withheld materially exculpatory evidence 
that the fingerprints found on the rifle, scope, and ammunition box insert had been 
run through AFIS and matched to Christopher IIill - Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 
6) Violation of the Eighth Amendment procedurally and substantively by the 
imposition of two concurrent terms of fixed life, plus a firearm enhancement of 15 
years. Miller v. Alabama, U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 
DNA R pp. 109-154. 
The District Court dismissed the petition. DNA R pp. 236-253. The Court dismissed all 
claims except the DNA testing request and the Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of Murphy 
v. State, supra.3 DNA R p. 240. The District Court dismissed some parts of the DNA testing 
request on the basis that comparison of previously tested but unidentified DNA samples with 
newly acquired DNA profiles would not utilize new techniques. DNA R p. 243. The Court 
3 Contrary to the District Court's understanding, Sarah never stipulated to the dismissal 
of any of her claims. DNA ROA; DNA Tr. 
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denied testing on the remaining DNA because it concluded that while further testing could 
determine the source of DNA samples found on the robe the State argued was worn by the killer, 
the gun used by the killer, the spent shell casing, and on other items associated with the murders. 
the knowledge of the source of the DNA would not make it more probable than not that Sarah is 
innocent. DNA R p. 247. 
The Court denied the Eighth Amendment claim because Sarah did not raise it in prior 
proceedings. The Court further held that Miller has not been found retroactive and does not 
apply in Idaho. DNA R pp. 248-252. 
Sarah filed a timely IRCP 59(e) motion to alter or amend. DNA R pp. 256-274. 
The District Court denied the motion. DNA R pp. 339-344. The Court held that the 
DNA statute requires not that the testing could potentially produce evidence of actual innocence, 
but rather that the testing has the potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence that would 
show that it is more likely than not that Sarah is innocent and that, based on the trial evidence, 
Sarah cannot meet this burden. DNA R pp. 341-342. The Court also stated that Sarah had 
conceded that requests to compare previously tested but unidentified DNA samples with newly 
acquired DNA and the expanded DNA databases were not cognizable under the post-conviction 
statute. DNA R p. 341, ftnt. 1. The Court also stated that it could not grant relief because "The 
amount of evidence against [Sarah], and the weight to be given to that evidence has been 
established at trial and in [Sarah's] first post-conviction case." In other words, Sarah cannot have 
DNA testing because the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the convictions. DNA R pp. 
342-343. 
Sarah filed a timely amended notice of appeal. DNA R pp. 345-350. 
6 
C. Statement of Facts 
The State's theory was that Sarah, at age 16, became enraged over being grounded for a 
few days because she had been with her boyfriend Bruno Santos without permission. So, she 
murdered her parents. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1490, In. 4-p. 1495, In. 4. 
The State offered that Sarah, who did not know how to load a bolt action rifle found a 
well-hidden rifle belonging to a renter living in an apartment above the family garage. She 
removed the scope, loaded the rifle, put on her bathrobe backwards, and went into her parents' 
bedroom in the early morning. Shooting left handed, although she is right handed, Sarah shot her 
sleeping mother in the head throwing blood and tissue throughout the bedroom and into the 
adjoining hallway. The State theorized that an unflappable Sarah then turned and shot her father 
as he walked toward her again projecting blood and tissue throughout the room and into the 
hallway. T Supp. Tr. p. 175, In. 11-p. 218, In. 1 O; p. 313, In. 13 - p. 344, ln. 11. 
The State examined Sarah repeatedly that day, but could not find any blood or tissue from 
either her mother or father on her body or clothing except for some blood on the bottom of her 
socks. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1551, In. 7-9; p. 1577, In. 14-17; p. 1612, In. 5-7; p. 1772, In. 4-5; p. 
1818, In. 15-p. 1819, In. 16; p. 1858, In. 10-13; Vol. 4, p. 2175, ln. 9-10; p. 2249, ln. 6-9; p. 
2280, In. 11-p. 2282, In.12; Vol. 6, p. 3653, In. 1-11; Vol. 7, p. 5032, In. 19-24; Vol. 8, p. 5754, 
In. 13. Vol. 8, p. 5560, In. 9-21. This blood was consistent with Sarah's statement that she 
stepped on the bloody carpet in the hallway to escape the house after hearing gunshots. T Tr. Vol. 
3, p. 1749, In. 1 - p. 1750, In. 1; p. 2099, In. 23 - p. 2102, In. 23; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 11-13. 
The State also inspected the rifle and the crime scene obtaining 1900 latent prints and found none 
of Sarah's fingerprints in any incriminating places. T Tr. Voi. 5, p. 3018, In. 14-15; p. 3068, In. 
7 
9-21. 
The State questioned Sarah repeatedly - even in the absence of counsel which Sarah had 
specifically requested and even after Sarah had been given Ambien, which is a hypnotic which 
affects one's state of mind - and Sarah never confessed. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 654, In. 9 - p. 655, In. 
21; Vol. 3, p. 1544, In. 3-12; p. 2106, In. l; Vol. 4, p. 2176, In. 10-15; p. 2177, In. 1- p. 2179, In. 
6-20; Vol. 4, p. 2424, In. 20 -p. 2444, In. 14; p. 2446, In. 8 - p. 2454, In. 19; p. 2488, In. 2-14; 
Vol. 5, p. 3368, In. 8 - p. 3371, In. 5; p. 3377, In. 1 - p. 3378, In. 6. 
The State explained the lack of blood on Sarah in a variety of ways. It speculated that 
Diane Johnson had tucked a comforter very tightly over her own head protecting Sarah from 
blood. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1986, In. 23 - p. 1987, In. 6; Vol. 4, p. 2313, In. 6 - p. 2314, In. 22. 
However, the State discarded this comforter and offered no explanation of why the comforter did 
not keep blood and tissue from going throughout the bedroom and hallway and onto the bathrobe 
but still protected Sarah. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4212, In. 9-17. The State speculated that Sarah wore her 
bathrobe backwards protecting some of her body, but had no explanation for how Sarah avoided 
getting blood on her lower legs and face which were not covered by the robe. Id. While the State 
had no explanation for how Sarah avoided getting blood on her face, See T Tr, the State 
theorized that Sarah wore a shower cap to avoid getting blood on her hair. However, the State 
could not find a shower cap at the house and so posited that Sarah had flushed it down the toilet. 
The State did not explain how this did not clog the toilet and did not attempt to find the cap in 
the plumbing. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5871, In. 11 - p. 5872, In. 10; Supp. Tr. p. 324, In. 23 -p. 325, In. 
2. The State explained the lack of fingerprints by theorizing that Sarah wore a combination of 
leather and latex gloves but did not explain how the gloves remained blood free and gunshot 
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residue free. T Supp. Tr. p. I 75, In. 11-p. 218, In. IO; p. 313, ln. 13 - p. 344, In. 11. 
Sarah was convicted. The jury also found a firearm enhancement under the instructions 
which required that she, not someone else, had used the gun. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 6174, In. 23-p. 
6175. In. 22. 
Well after the trial, the State learned that fingerprints on the rifle and scope matched 
Christopher Hill's prints. Hill was a friend of the renter with no connection to Sarah. However, 
the State withheld this information from Sarah. EH 1 Tr. p. 652, In. 2-21; p. 654, In. 2-22; p. 659, 
In. I 1-14. 
During police questioning, Sarah reported a dispute her mother had with a cleaning 
woman, Janet Sylten, who had recently been paroled from prison on a violent battery offense. 
Sarah's account of the dispute was consistent with evidence the State got from other witnesses, 
including Sylten and her boss. Sarah also told the police that she and her family heard intruders 
in the yard shortly before her parents were killed and that the voices seemed to include Sylten's 
voice. Footprints in the yard were consistent with the presence of multiple people shortly before 
the murders. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1529, ln. 10 - p. 1532, ln. 24; p. 1561, ln. 4-22; p. 2095, ln. 6- p. 
2098, In. 9; Vol. 4, p. 2432, In. 22 - p. 2436, In. 6; p. 2695, In. 16-24; p. 2811, In. 1-p. 2815, In. 
22; p. 2824, In. 1 - p. 2827, In. 5; Vol. 5, p. 2836, ln. 25 - p. 2841, ln. 6; p. 2889, In. 4-6; Vol. 6, 
p. 3764, In. 7 - p. 3765, In. 25; p. 3776, ln. 22 - p. 3779, ln. 24. 
In her DNA and successive petition, Sarah sought testing of the following: 
a) Bloodstain 2 from the robe contains a mixture of at least three individuals 
including an unknown individual. This evidence may now be compared to a 
reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of 
trial, and deduced profiles may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS 
databases. 
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b) The tissue from the left collar area of the robe is from an unknown male. Alan 
Johnson and Bruno Santos are excluded as potential contributors. This evidence 
may now be compared to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not 
available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles may he submitted to the State 
and federal CODIS databases. 
c) Bloodstain Con the rifle is from an unknown male excluding Alan Johnson and 
Bruno Santos. This evidence may now be compared to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial, and deduced profiles 
may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
d) No conclusions could be reached due to insufficient amounts of DNA 
concerning bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the lower left side of the 
robe, the tissue from the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the inside 
left sleeve of the robe, the stain from Bruno Santos' pants, the fibers imbedded in 
unknown material, bloodstain B from the rifle, and bloodstain G from the rifle. 
This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification and 
purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from 
the time of trial and to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not 
available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited 
forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post 
amplification cleanup with Montage columns, and Low Copy Number (LCN) 
DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the State and federal 
CODIS databases. 
e) Robe samples #24-30 were never analyzed and may now be subjected to DNA 
analysis. This evidence may now be tested using advanced DNA amplification 
and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to reference samples 
from the time of trial and to a reference sample from Christopher Hill which was 
not available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at 
accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques 
include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low Copy Number 
(LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to the State and 
federal CODIS databases. 
f) The results from Robe sample 34, if any, are not listed on the Celmark DNA 
report. This evidence may now be tested using advanced amplification techniques 
and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a 
reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of 
trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as 
Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup 
with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The 
deduced profiles may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
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g) DNA from the unidentified fingerprint on the .264 round (Item # 14) may now 
be tested using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference 
sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The 
new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, 
Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with 
Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
h) DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane and Alan 
Johnson's bedroom door (Items # 15-16) may now be tested using advanced 
techniques not available at the time of trial and compared to reference samples 
from the time of trial and after and submitted to a CO DIS database. 
i) DNA from the palm prints (Items 20-2 and 20-3) may now be tested using 
advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, 
compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not fully available at the time of trial. The new DNA 
techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celrnark and 
others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage 
columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may 
be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
j) DNA from the print on the empty shell casing (Item 12-1) may now be tested 
using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference 
sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The 
new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, 
Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with 
Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
k) One of the two hair samples recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle could 
not be matched to Sarah or any of her maternal relatives by mitochondrial DNA 
testing. This hair can now be compared to a DNA reference sample from 
Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. 
1) Two of the three hairs removed from Bruno Santo's sweater were excluded as 
coming from Sarah and could not be identified as coming from a particular 
maternal line. These hairs can now be compared to a new DNA reference sample 
from Christopher Hill. One of the hairs also had a small root and could be 
analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques and once 
analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a reference 
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sample from Christopher Hill which was not available at the time of trial. The 
new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode. 
Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup with 
Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced 
profiles may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
m) DNA from an unknown contributor found on the inside of the latex glove can 
now be analyzed using advanced DNA amplification and purification techniques 
and once analyzed, compared to reference samples from the time of trial to a 
reference sample from Christopher Hill which was not fully available at the time 
of trial. The new DNA techniques are available at accredited forensic labs such as 
Bode, Celmark and others. These techniques include post amplification cleanup 
with Montage columns and Low Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The 
deduced profiles may be submitted to the State and federal CODIS databases. 
n) Low levels of DNA from an unidentified source were found on the leather 
glove from the garbage can. That DNA can now be analyzed using advanced 
DNA amplification and purification techniques and once analyzed, compared to 
reference samples from the time of trial to a reference sample from Christopher 
Hill which was not fully available at the time of trial. The new DNA techniques 
arc available at accredited forensic labs such as Bode, Celmark and others. These 
techniques include post amplification cleanup with Montage columns and Low 
Copy Number (LCN) DNA analysis. The deduced profiles may be submitted to 
the State and federal CODIS databases. 
o) A bloody hand print was found on the sheet under the pillow beneath Diane. 
DNA from that handprint can now be amplified using new fingerprint DNA 
analysis to determine whether the handprint was made by Alan or some other 
person after Diane was shot. See T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4238, ln. 25 - p. 4239, ln. 12. 
DNA R pp. 105-109. 
The District Court denied the testing and the Eighth Amendment claim and denied a 
subsequent IRCP 59(e) motion to reconsider. DNA R pp. 236-252; 339-343. 
Ill. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court en in failing to permit DNA testing? Specifically, did the Court 
err in concluding that comparison of previously obtained but unidentified DNA against 
Christopher Hill's DNA and the expanded government databases was not a new technology not 
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available at the time of trial? Further, did the Court err in its analysis of whether the result of the 
requested DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that Sarah is innocent? And did the Court err in 
concluding that based on the trial evidence Sarah cannot ever show that she should be allowed 
DNA testing? 
2. Should this Court overrule Murphy v. State, supra, as it is both manifestly wrong and 
an unwise relinquishment of state sovereignty? If so, should Claims 2-5, which were dismissed 
pursuant to Murphy, be remanded to the District Court to determine whether sufficient cause 
exists to allow the claims to be raised in a second petition? 
3. Did the District Court err in dismissing the Miller claim as it was not waived, Miller 
applies retroactively to Idaho, and Sarah's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as 
interpreted in Miller? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred in denying DNA testing 
1. Standard of review 
In deciding a motion for summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, the 
court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner. Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 
18, 24, 253 P.3d 692, 698 (2011 ). 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises 
free review. State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 78,356 P.3d 368, 371(2015), citing State v. 
Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454,457,314 P.3d 136, 139 (2013). 
13 
2. Purpose of the DNA statute 
The Legislature amended Idaho Code § 19-4902 in 200 I to allow post-conviction testing 
of DNA in appropriate cases. The statement of purpose reads in part: 
The purpose of this legislation is to allow for post-conviction DNA testing in 
appropriate cases. While prosecutors have been utilizing DNA technology for 
nearly a decade in seeking convictions, Idaho inmates have no statutory right to 
tests that may exonerate them. In the past decade DNA testing has resulted in the 
post-conviction exoneration of more than 65 individuals in the United States and 
Canada. 
2001 Idaho Laws Ch. 317 (H.B. 242) ( emphasis added). 
To fulfill this purpose, the Legislature provided in § l 9-4902(b) that the testing may be 
requested as to evidence that was secured in relation to the trial which resulted in conviction but 
"which was not subject to the testing that is now requested because the technology for the testing 
was not available at the time of trial." 
The Legislature intended to allow testing in cases where the testing may exonerate the 
defendant. The Legislature did not intent to limit testing to only those cases where even prior to 
testing the defendant can show that the results will exonerate her. 
The Legislature fulfilled its intent through two sets of requirements. The first set are 
those required to obtain testing, I.C. § 19-4902( e ). That section provides: 
( e) The trial court shall allow the testing ... upon a determination that: 
(1) The result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce 
new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more 
probable than not that the petitioner is innocent; and 
(2) The testing method requested would likely produce admissible 
results under the Idaho rules of evidence. 
LC. § i 9-4902(e). 
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The second set of requirements applies once the testing has been completed: 
(t) In the event the fingerprint or forensic DNA test results demonstrate, in light of 
all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who committed the 
offense, the court shall order the appropriate relief. 
I.C. § l 9-4902(f). 
To get testing, one must show that the technology for the testing was not available at the 
time of trial and that it has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent. Thus, in Fields v. State, 
supra, testing was allowed and only after the testing did the District Court deny relief because the 
evidence resulting from the testing did not demonstrate that Fields was not the murderer. 
3. Comparison of previously obtained but unidentified DNA against Christopher Hill's 
DNA and the expanded government databases is a new technology not available at the 
time of trial 
The District Court denied some of the requested testing because, "[t]he existence of new 
DNA profiles with which to compare samples tested prior to trial by DNA technology existing at 
the time, does not satisfy the requirements of LC.§ 19-4902(b)." DNA R p. 243. This 
conclusion is without support in controlling case law and is contrary to the purpose of the DNA 
statute. 
While I. C. § l 9-4902(b) requires that "the techn9logy for the testing was not available at 
the time of trial," the statute does not further define what that means. Sarah is unaware of any 
Idaho case law interpreting the meaning of the word "technology." 
However, the meaning of new technology is clear under the well-known rule of statutory 
construction ·'[t]hat the language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary 
meanmg." LC.§ 73-113; Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226,231, 3i P.3d 248,253 (2001). 
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The word "technology," in this context. means "a manner of accomplishing a task 
especially using technical processes, methods. or knowledge <new technologies for information 
storage>." www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/teclmology ( emphasis on knowledge added, 
emphasis on technologies in original). While DNA testing was available at the time of the trial, 
new processes and methods of testing DNA and new knowledge about DNA, including the DNA 
profiles now available on COD IS and the DNA profile of Christopher Hill, are new technologies. 
Consequently, the "technology" Sarah proposes to use now was not available at the time of trial. 
This construction of the statute is not only in accord with LC. § 73-113 and Albee v. Judy, 
supra. It is also consistent with the legislative intent behind the statute. And, as noted by State 
v. McKean, supra, 'The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative 
intent." Id., citing State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
The legislative purpose of the DNA statute is to allow testing in appropriate cases where 
the results of the testing may exonerate the defendant. (At the time the statute was first enacted, 
the legislature referred to 65 cases of DNA exoneration in the United States and Canada. Today 
that number is 330 in just the United States.4 Defining new technology as the District Court did 
here so as to prohibit comparison of crime scene DNA profiles with newly obtained profiles of 
alternate perpetrators by eliminating the knowledge element from the definition of technology is 
inconsistent with the intent to make DNA exoneration available for the wrongly convicted in 
Idaho. 
Sarah requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decision denying testing on the 
4 http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-faise-imprisonment (Accessed September I, 
2015).) 
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basis that new CO DIS and new potential perpetrator profiles arc not new technology. 
4. The District Court erred in its anal vs is of whether the result of the requested DNA 
testing has the scientific potential to produce new. noncumulative evidence that would 
show that it is more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. 
The Legislature intended to allow testing in cases where the testing may exonerate the 
defendant. The Legislature did not intend to limit testing to only those cases where even prior to 
testing the defendant can show that the testing will exonerate her. 
To get testing, one must show that the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, 
noncumulative evidence that would show it is more probable than not that the petitioner is 
innocent. Thus, in Fields v. State, supra, testing was allowed and after the testing the District 
Court summarily denied relief because the evidence resulting from the testing did not 
demonstrate that Fields was not the murderer. 
In this case, rather than waiting until after the testing to weigh the new evidence produced 
by the testing to see if the new evidence demonstrated that Sarah did not kill her parents, the 
District Court considered the evidence presented at trial and concluded that no DNA results 
could ever make it more probable than not that Sarah is innocent because the evidence was 
sufficient to support the convictions and the jury heard evidence that a person other than Sarah 
could have been the killer but convicted Sarah anyway. DNA R pp. 245-247. 
Under this analysis, no petitioner can ever get DNA testing because no one can ever 
prove prior to the testing that the testing will demonstrate innocence and further every person 
convicted will have been convicted by a jury which rejected the theory that someone else was 
responsible for the crime. Indeed, identity must be an issue at trial in order to obtain DNA 
testing. LC. § i 9-4902(c)(1 ). Cieariy, it was not the intent of the legislature to preciude any 
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defendant from ever getting DNA testing. 
In denying testing, the District Court stated that Sarah's counsel "admitted at the 
10/20/14 hearing that the standard required by LC.§ I9-4902(e)(l) has not been met.'· DNA R 
p. 247, ft. 8. What counsel said was this: "We are not in a position to say that the evidence will 
or will not, more probably than not, demonstrate the innocence of Ms. Johnson ... but we need 
the testing." Id. Counsel merely made the commonsense observation that no one can know what 
the results of the testing will be until the testing is done. That was not an admission that the 
requested testing does not have the "scientific potential" to produce evidence of actual 
innocence. It was a request to permit such testing to see if the new DNA evidence is exonerating. 
See Fields v. State, 151 Idaho at 23-24, 253 P.3d at 697-98, noting that test results by themselves 
can never be exonerating. Rather, testing is to be allowed when it has the probability to produce 
evidence of innocence the petitioner cannot show before the testing that the testing will prove 
mnocence. 
Sarah does not need to prove in advance of the testing what the results will be. A 
showing that the testing methods have the "scientific potential" to produce evidence of actual 
innocence is not the same as the showing of actual innocence based upon those test results. A 
reading of subsection ( e )(1) that conflates the two concepts is contrary to the plain language of 
the statute and the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. 
"[T]hose words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894, 
265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ). Here there is no requirement in the text of the statute that the 
petitioner prove in advance what the results of the testing will tum out to be. 
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Further, that reading nullifies the statute because no petitioner could ever say that he or 
she knows what the testing will actually show. Even if it could be said that the statute is 
ambiguous, "[i]t is incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation which 
will not render it a nullity." State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 969, 318 P.3d 955, 959 (Ct. App. 
2014 ). What counsel was telling the Court is that Sarah "need[s] the testing" to produce the 
evidence which could show she is actually innocent in order to be granted appropriate relief 
under subsection (f) of the statute. She should be granted the testing due to the scientific 
potential of the advanced DNA testing to produce such evidence. 
a Sarah has made the required showing under the facts of the case 
The advanced DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative 
evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. LC. § 19-
4903( e ). The DNA testing has the scientific potential to identify the person who fired the murder 
weapon. If that person is not Sarah, the DNA evidence would show that she is innocent of first-
degree murder as charged and found by the jury. 
The Court, however, found that DNA testing was not likely to produce proof of actual 
innocence due to "the 'mountain of evidence' against Johnson." DNA R p. 245. As set out 
above, weighing the evidence is not appropriate at this juncture. The Court does not have the 
DNA evidence to weigh. However, even if weighing the evidence was appropriate, the District 
Court's conclusion was incorrect. 
The State's theory of the case was far-fetched: Sarah was so selfish, so obsessed with 
Bruno, and so enraged by being grounded that, even though she had never before committed any 
act of serious or gun violence against anyone, she stayed up aii night plotting her parents' 
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murder. In a stroke of luck, she was grounded while the renter was out of town and on the night 
before the regular garbage collection day. Coming up with this plot on the fly, Sarah took the 
rifle, no one could say she even knew about, from its hiding place in the renter's quarters, wore 
some combination of three gloves without getting her fingerprints or any blood on any of them, 
took the scope off the rifle without harming fingerprints placed there by the last person to shoot 
the rifle, put on the robe and a shower cap, and shot her sleeping mother from a left-handed 
position, although she is right-handed and had never before shot a rifle. Not upset or deterred by 
the horrible result of the explosion of tissue and blood, she next shot her father in the chest while 
he tried to reach out to her. And, she miraculously avoided getting any blood or tissue on her 
pajama pants, gloves, hands, face, or hair. She flushed the shower cap down the toilet without 
getting any blood on herself and without causing any plumbing problems. She then cooly placed 
knives on the beds without getting her fingerprints or DNA on them. She then ran out of the 
house and put the robe and two of the three gloves in the garbage, again without getting blood 
from the robe on her hands. In a pretend hysteria, she sought "help" from the neighbors, all the 
while forgetting or not caring that she had left cartridges, her keys including a key to the renter's 
quarters, one of the gloves, and a pistol magazine in her bedroom, pistol ammunition in the robe, 
and a cartridge shell and another gun in the garage, and forgetting whether she wanted to tell the 
police that the door to her bedroom was open or closed at the time of the shootings. T Supp. Tr. 
p.175,ln.11-p.218,ln. lO;p.313,ln.13-p.344,ln.11. 
After all this, Sarah resisted confessing even when questioned without requested counsel 
and after being medicated. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 654, In. 9 - p. 655, In. 21; Vol. 3, p. 1544, In. 3-12; p. 
2106, In. 1; Vol. 4, p. 21 76. In. l 0-15; p. 2177, In. 1- p. 2179, In. 6-20; Vol. 4, p. 2424, In. 20 -p. 
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2444. In. 14: p. 2446. In. 8 - p. 2454, ln. 19; p. 2488, ln. 2-14; Vol. 5, p. 3368, In. 8 - p. 3371. 
In. 5: p. 3377, In. I - p. 3378, In. 6. 
In addition, the evidence the District Court states "placed Johnson at the scene and linked 
her to the murders," DNA R p. 245, is not strong. Each area specifically listed by the Court is 
discussed below. 
"Her stories were inconsistent and conflicted with the evidence." DNA R p. 245. 
On the morning of the murders, within minutes of Sarah arriving in hysterics at the 
Richards' house, the police arrived. Throughout that day and the days to follow, Sarah was 
questioned numerous times. The questioning included two 20-minute interviews with Detective 
Harkins on the day her parents were killed, first at 8:30 a.m. and then at 11:30 a.m. Detective 
Harkins described the second interview as accusatory and said that he read Miranda warnings but 
he had to initial the form as Sarah was too upset to sign. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 2106, ln. 1; Vol. 4, p. 
2177, In. 1- p. 2179, In. 5. The next day, Sarah was questioned at the sheriffs office and her 
statements that she had an attorney went unheeded. T Tr. p. 2425, In. 23 - p. 2444, ln. 14; p. 
2488, ln. 2-14. She was again questioned without counsel on September 12 and 13 at the 
sheriffs office. T Tr. p. 2446, In. 23 - p. 2452, In. 1. On the 13t\ the sheriff directly accused her 
of murdering her parents but she maintained her innocence. T Tr. p. 2446, ln. 8 - p. 2454, In. 19. 
At least two of the interviews on the day of her parents' deaths were conducted after 
Sarah had been given Ambien, a hypnotic which makes people suggestible, to calm her down. T 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1544, In. 3-12; Vol. 4, p. 2176, ln. 10-15. Officer Tremble, who questioned Sarah 
after she had been given the Ambien, described her as "disoriented." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1870, In. 8-
14. 
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Throughout the questioning, Sarah remained consistent that she had been in bed, heard 
two shots, ran to her parents' bedroom door, called out, did not hear a response, fled, and heard 
the sliding screen door to the bedroom open and shut as she ran. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, In. 1 - p. 
1750, In. 1; p. 2099, In. 23 - p. 2102, In. 23; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 11-13. 
Her statements both volunteered and in response to police questioning were not consistent 
in some details. Sometimes she said she was asleep when she heard the first shot; sometimes she 
said that she had been awakened by the shower before she heard the shot. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, 
In. 1-2. Sometimes she said that she got out of bed upon hearing the first shot; sometimes she 
said that she stayed in bed until after hearing the second shot. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1749, In. 12-17; p. 
2101, In. 5; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 1-4. Sometimes she said that her bedroom door was open; 
sometimes she said that it was closed; and still other times she said that it was partly open. T Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 2100, In. 22-24; Vol. 4, p. 2428, In. 12-13; p. 2492, In. 13 p. 2493, In. 9. Sometimes 
she said that her parents' bedroom door was closed; sometimes she said that it was open. T Tr. 
Vol. 3., p. 1812, In. 11-12; Vol. 4, p. 2430, In. 15-19. (According to the State's expert, both 
bedroom doors had to be open. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4143, In. 17-23.) 
Sarah did not give inconsistent stories about what she was doing when her parents were 
killed. She said she was in her room in her bed when the first shot was fired, she went to her 
parents' room and called out, and then she fled. While some details within this statement 
changed, the thrust of the statement did not. 
Anyone would have difficulty remembering details under such circumstances. It was no 
surprise and certainly not incriminating evidence that Sarah was unable to remember whether she 
was asleep or awake when the first shot was fired, the exact words that she said when she cailed 
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out, and whether the bedroom doors were open or closed. 
If Sarah gave "inconsistent stories" about what she was doing it was more likely to be a 
result of the shock and distress felt by a girl who saw her family destroyed by another's crime 
than evidence of a carefully planned and cooly executed premeditated murder. Sarah's story 
would have been totally straight, well thought out and consistent over time had the crime 
described by the State actually taken place. 
Much more remarkable is that Sarah never confessed or even made incriminating 
statements notwithstanding the best efforts of the State to obtain them. Sarah was particularly 
vulnerable to police interrogation techniques being only sixteen years old, of average or low 
average intelligence and ability to learn, with no prior experience with the police and now 
orphaned through a violent event. She maintained her innocence through repeated questioning. 
She was questioned by experts in interrogation repeatedly on the day she lost her parents. She 
was questioned in the absence of counsel. She was questioned right after having been given a 
hypnotic drug. She was questioned many times. She was accused of patricide and matricide. 
But, despite the State's very best efforts, she did not confess. T Tr. Vol. 1, p. 654, In. 9 - p. 655, 
In. 21; Vol. 3, p. 1544, In. 3-12; p. 1749, In. 1 -p. 1750, In. l; p. 2099, In. 23 -p. 2102, In. 23; 
p. 2106, In. l; Vol 4. p. 2176, In. 10-15; p. 2177, In. 1 -p. 2179, In. 5; p. 2179, In. 6-20; p. 2424, 
In. 20 - p. 2425, In. 12; p. 2425, In. 23 - p. 2444, In. 14; p. 2430, In. 11-13; p. 2446, In. 23 - p. 
2452, In. l; p. 2446, In. 8 -p. 2454, In. 19; p. 2488, In. 2-14; Vol. 5, p. 3368, In. 8 -p. 3371, In. 
5; p. 3377, In. 1 - p. 3378, In. 6. 
The evidence against Sarah was not overwhelming as has been asserted. 
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"Her DNA was found in a latex glove, found wrapped in a blood splattered 
robe. and discarded in a trash can on the property." DNA R p. 245 
While the State's DNA expert found DNA matching Sarah's on the latex glove. the glove 
was so old that it had become discolored and the expert could not say the DNA was of recent 
origin. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3110, In. 1-3. The expert also found DNA from someone else. not 
matched to any known sample, on that glove. The contributor of that sample could have been 
male or female. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3110, In. 17-20; p. 3120, ln. 17-20. There is no evidence that 
the latex glove was worn by Sarah on the morning of the murders and not at some other time in 
the far past. 
Further, the gloves, unlike the rifle and the robe, did not have blood on them. According 
to the expert testimony and common sense, this means that they were not worn during the 
shooting. It is impossible that anyone wore the gloves in an environment where both the gun 
being held and the robe on the arms holding the gun got blood on them but the gloves remained 
pristine. This disproves the State's theory that Sarah was the shooter. 
Finally, the presence of the gloves in Sarah's room and the garbage can outside is more 
consistent with an intent by the real killer to divert suspicion to Sarah than some theory that 
Sarah carefully plotted and planned the murders and then left gloves not even used in her room 
and the trash where they were quickly discovered by the police. 
"She knew where the murder weapon was kept (in a guest house safe) and had 
requested a key a few days earlier." DNA R p. 245 
The murder weapon was not kept in the guest house safe. It was kept, covered by 
blankets, in a closet of the guest house. It was not in a safe. At trial, the renter testified that he 
kept the rifle in his closet along with three other guns. T Tr. Vol 4, p. 2702, ln. 8- p. 2703, ln. 2. 
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He also testified that Sarah had a garage door opener to the guest house and that the weapons and 
ammunition were in the closet when she cleaned his apartment and stayed there with friends. T 
Tr. Vol 4, p. 2693, In.17-20; p. 2694, In. 25-p. 2696, In. 6; p. 2715, ln.12-25. While Sarah had 
cleaned the guest house, there was no evidence that she knew where the rifle was hidden nor is it 
likely she would be cleaning the inside of a closet. Sarah's half-brother, Matt Johnson, testified 
that he had been in the guest house after the renter had moved in but he did not know there were 
guns in the closet. T Tr. Vol. 7, pg. 4527, In. 1-3. Likewise, family guests had stayed in the 
renter's quarters for multiple days using the closet just prior to the murders and they did not 
discover the hidden guns. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 4525, In. 22- p. 4527, In. 16; Vol. 8, p. 5900, In. 8-25. 
Since there was no safe in the guest house, Sarah could not have asked for the key to the 
guest house gun safe. There was testimony that she asked for the key to the Johnsons' gun safe 
two days before her parents were murdered. However, Matt Johnson, as a witness for the State, 
testified that Sarah kept jewelry in the safe, an innocent reason for a request for the key. T Tr. 
Vol. 7, p. 4562, In. 15-24. 
The Court's analysis is also flawed because it evaluates the evidence both under a 
principal theory ("[T]he jury could have convicted Johnson if they believed that she was the 
shooter ... ") and as under an accomplice theory(" ... or if they believed that she aided and 
abetted the murder."). DNA R p. 245, ftnt. 5. In fact, however, the jury found that Sarah was the 
shooter because it returned the deadly weapon enhancement. The enhancement jury instruction 
required the jury to find Sarah possessed the weapon. 5 There is no accomplice liability for the 
5 The Court's instruction was: "If you find the defendant guilty of murder, you must next 
consider whether the defendant displayed, used, threatened or attempted to use a firearm in the 
commission of the crime." T Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 6093, In. 24 - pg. 6094, In. 2 (emphasis added). The 
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firearm enhancement as it is a sentencing enhancement and not an offense itself. Thus, the jury 
must have unanimously found Sarah was the shooter and rejected the State's accomplice liability 
theory. In light of that, any new DNA evidence which shows that Sarah was not the shooter is 
evidence of innocence. 
But even if an accomplice liability theory is considered, evidence showing who the shooter 
actually was would show innocence if that person were Bruno Santos or someone totally 
unconnected with Sarah, such as a member of a criminal gang with connections to Bruno.6 Bruno 
testified at the criminal trial that he was not involved in the murder. T Tr. Vol. IV p. 2769, In. 11-
13. If his DNA or the DNA of one of his associates appears on the rifle or spent shell casings it 
would exonerate Sarah as the shooter. At the same time, it would exonerate her under an aiding 
and abetting theory as the State argued in closing argument at the criminal trial that Mr. Santos 
was not the one Sarah aided and abetted in the murder: "He's the reason for this. Again, Sarah's 
the means. The fact of the matter is we had an extensive investigation of his involvement." "If 
he's the killer, if he's the real murderer, is he going to come back [to the United States] 
voluntarily?" Supp. T., pg. 210, In. 25 - pg. 211, In. 24. The State cannot argue here that evidence 
that Bruno was the shooter would not exonerate Sarah when it argued at trial that Sarah did not 
aid and abet Bruno in the killings. 
Court continued: "If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used, 
displayed, threatened with or attempted to use a firearm in the commission of the above crime, 
then you must indicate on the verdict form submitted to you." T Tr. Vol. 9, pg. 6094, In. 8-12 
( emphasis added). 
6 Bruno is currently serving drug trafficking and delivery sentences at ISCC. He is not 
parole eligible until 2018, and his sentences will not expire until 2024. 
www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detaii/99797 
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In addition. identifying a third-party DNA source other than Bruno from previously 
untested samples could make it more probable than not that Sarah is innocent. For example, the 
DNA testing has the scientific potential to show that Hill, whose fingerprints were found on the 
murder weapon. also loaded the weapon if, for example, his DNA is found on the spent cartridge. 
That evidence would exonerate Sarah because there is no link between her and Hill. Or, the DNA 
evidence could implicate someone else totally unconnected to Sarah. Evidence showing the 
shooter had no connection to Sarah would be evidence of innocence. Or there could be DNA 
from Syiten, the cleaning woman. See T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2804, In. 4-6. Sylten was released from 
prison on parole shortly before the murders. She had served some number of years (she claimed 
that she could not remember the details) for grand theft and battery on a correctional officer. T Tr. 
Vol. 4, p. 2824, In. 1 - p. 2827, In. 5; Vol. 5, p. 2889, ln. 4-6. After she cleaned the Johnson 
home, Diane Johnson discovered she was missing two expensive bottles of Estee Lauder lotion. 
When Diane alerted Sylten's employer about the missing items, she searched Sylten's living area 
and found lotions. She immediately fired Sylten. T Tr. Vol. 4, p. 2433, In. 4-6; Vol. 6, p. 3764, 
ln. 7 - p. 3765, In. 25. Of course, Sylten's parole could be revoked if it were discovered she had 
been stealing. The presence of Sylten's DNA would exonerate Sarah because there is no link 
between Sarah and Sylten. 
b. Infact, the evidence isfarfrom overwhelming. 
The District Court overlooked substantial evidence showing that Sarah is innocent. 
The State processed nineteen hundred latent fingerprints. Not one matched Sarah's. T Tr. 
Vol. 5, p. 3018, In. 14-15; p. 3068, ln. 9-21. 
The bedroom and hallway were "covered with biood and flesh and brain material running 
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up to the ceiling, across the ceiling of the bedroom, going towards the bathroom." T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 
1658, In. 11-17. "Things were dripping off the wall and off the ceiling on the floor." T Tr. Vol. 
3, p. 1659, In. 7-10. The State's expert testified that the explosion of Diane's head was a 
"massive amount of eruption" with "massive energy." He described bone and tissue "hitting and 
ricocheting off and coming back to that area. That's how powerful it gets." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4169, 
In. 14-1; p. 4172, In. 10-14. The forensic pathologist testified that Alan, having been shot in the 
lung, could have been coughing out blood in a high-velocity spatter. T Tr. Vol. 8, p. 5376, In. 21-
25. The State found blood on the robe from both Diane and Alan in patterns indicating that the 
blood was moving very quickly at high energy when it was deposited. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4205, In. 9-
17. The State's expert testified, "[O]ne thing, again, that can't ever be changed, it's a fact that 
can't be taken away, is the evidence that the robe is covered in a (sic) waist-down with the blood 
of Diane Johnson and Alan Johnson in a high velocity particulate." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4211, In. 14-
18. As the State's expert testified, 'The shooter in this case did block the [blood] spatter coming 
back, yes." T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4251, In. 5-6. 
Further, the robe had gunshot residue on it. Supp. Tr. p. 206, In. 24. 
Yet, the State repeatedly inspected and tested Sarah's body and clothing, and she did not 
have any blood on her. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1818, In. 15-p. 1819, In. 16; p. 1858, In. 10-13; Vol. 4, p. 
2249, In. 6-9, p. 2280, In. 11-p. 2282, In. 8; p. 2472, In. 19-23; Vol. 6, p. 3653, In. 1-11; Vol. 7, p. 
5032, In. 19-24; Vol. 8, p. 5754, In. 13. Likewise, the State offered no proof that Sarah had 
gunshot residue on her body, hands or clothing. 
The State found fibers on the rifle, but the fibers did not come from any material matched 
to Sarah's clothing or even anything in the Johnson household. T Tr. Vol. 6, p. 4243, In. 12-14. 
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The State found a piece of male human tissue on the robe which did not belong to Alan 
Johnson or Bruno. T R Vol. 4, p. I 036. Some man, not Sarah, lost this tissue while wearing or in 
very close proximity to the robe. 
As discussed earlier, the State posited that Sarah did not have blood on her because her 
mother had tucked a comforter tightly over her own head before she was killed. Supp Tr. p. 197, 
In. 13-20. But, this did not explain why the robe, walls, ceiling and floor had blood on them. 
And, this did not explain how Diane could have or would have tucked a comforter over her own 
head so tightly that Officer Kirtley had to use force to pull it down. T Tr. Vol. 7, p. 5223, In. 1 O-
p. 5225, In. 6. And, although the State did not collect the comforter as evidence, both Officer 
Kirtley and Stu Robinson, the officers in charge of the scene, testified that they did not see a bullet 
hole in it. This lack of a hole weakens the State's theory about the comforter protecting Sarah 
from blood and tissue. And, the State offered no explanation whatsoever as to why Alan's blood 
was on the rifle and robe, but not on Sarah. See Supp. Tr. p. 175, In. 10-p. 218, In. 1 O; p. 313, In. 
13-p. 344, In. 12. 
The State found the scope from the rifle used to kill the Johnsons on the bed in the rental 
quarters. T Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1842, In. 16-18. The State found latent prints on the rifle, scope, and 
ammunition, and those prints are not Sarah's. The existence of the prints is inconsistent with the 
State's theory that Sarah used the rifle while wearing gloves, as the handling would have removed 
or obscured any older latent prints. T Tr. Vol. 5, p. 3028, In. 10-12; p. 3044, In. 15-21; p. 3052, 
In. 11-21. Moreover, the latent prints were "fresh" and left by the last person to touch the scope 
and rifle. EHl Tr. p. 849, In. 3-p. 854, In. 19. 
The State did not have an overwhelming case against Sarah. 
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c. Fields v. State is not apposite. 
Finally, the District Court's reliance on Fields v. State, supra, to deny testing is misplaced. 
In Fields, the victim was stabbed to death during a robbery. The District court permitted DNA 
testing of scrapings found under the victim's fingernails and of some hairs found on her clothing. 
The DNA profile obtained did not match Mr. Fields, but also could not be matched to any other 
person. Mr. Fields argued this showed he was actually innocent because the victim likely 
scratched the attacker and therefore the absence of his DNA proved he was not the killer. The 
Supreme Court held that DNA evidence was not sufficient to show that he was actually innocent. 
The Court said that, "Under Idaho Code § 19-4902(f), it is the fingerprint or DNA test results that 
must demonstrate that the petitioner is not the one who committed the offense. In this case there 
would have to be admissible evidence showing that the hairs or fingernail scrapings tested came 
from the murderer." 151 Idaho at 24,253 P.3d at 698. 
Sarah's case is in a totally different procedural posture because, unlike Fields, the District 
Court has not permitted the evidence to be tested. 
Nevertheless, the District Court writes that, "[t]he same is true in this case. Further testing 
might reveal the source of the DNA samples found on Johnson's robe, on the gun, and elsewhere, 
but that knowledge does nothing to establish that the source of those samples was present in the 
Johnson home on the morning of the crime, that the source of those samples was the shooter, or 
that Johnson didn't aid and abet the murder of her parents." DNA R p. 247. In fact, however, 
whether further testing revealing the source of the DNA samples establishes any of those things 
depends on what evidence is found. If the piece of flesh with unknown male DNA found on the 
co liar of the robe is Hili' s, it had to have gotten there on the morning of the murders because Hiii 
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was not otherwise at the house wearing the robe. Likewise, if it is his DNA in the fingerprints 
found on the cartridges still loaded in the rifle or on the spent shell casing, then he had to be the 
person who loaded the rifle before entering the house and firing the fatal shots. The DNA 
evidence would be corroborated by the fact that his fingerprints were found on the rifle and the 
scope which was removed just prior to the shootings. This evidence would exonerate Sarah both 
as the principal and as an accomplice because there is no reason to suspect the two acted in 
concert. 
The same is true if the Bloodstain 2 from the robe has the DNA from Hill. That bloodstain 
could not have been placed at any time other than when the murders occurred. 
Bloodstain C on the rifle is from an unknown male excluding Alan Johnson and Bruno 
Santos. The source of that bloodstain is either the shooter or someone present during the 
shootings. If that person has no connection to Sarah it shows her innocence both as a principal 
and an accomplice. The same is true concerning bloodstain 24 from the robe, the tissue from the 
lower left side of the robe, the tissue from the inside lower back of the robe, the tissue from the 
inside left sleeve of the robe, bloodstain B from the rifle, and bloodstain F from the rifle. And the 
same is true regarding the DNA from the unidentified fingerprints on the doorknob set on Diane 
and Alan Johnson's bedroom door and the unidentified palm prints. The same is true of the two 
hair samples recovered from the barrel of the .264 rifle which could not be matched to Sarah or 
any of her maternal relatives by mitochondrial DNA testing. If this hair came from Hill it was 
placed there at the time of the murder not when he was target shooting with the rifle many years 
prior as he claimed. Likewise, the DNA from an unknown contributor which was found on the 
inside of the latex glove can now be anaiyzed using advanced DNA ampiification and purification 
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techniques. Assuming, as the District Court does, that evidence shows the identity of the shooter, 
if that DNA came from Hill, it would be exonerating to Sarah. She could have placed her DNA at 
anytime the glove was in the home but Hill's DNA could only have been placed there at the time 
of the murders as there is no evidence he used the glove prior to that day. The same is true 
regarding the low levels of DNA from an unidentified source that were found on the leather glove 
from the garbage can. If the DNA from the bloody handprint found on the sheet under the pillow 
beneath Diane Johnson is Hill's, it was placed there at the time of the murder. Most of the 
statements above can be repeated substituting the name Matthew Johnson or Janet Sylten or even 
Bruno Santos for Christopher Hill. Indeed, even if the for now unidentified DNA is from no one 
yet associated with the Johnson household, it will show who killed Alan and Diane. 
Again, the District Court conflated the requirement under subsection ( e )( 1) that, in order to 
obtain testing, "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-
cumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is 
innocent," with the petitioner's ultimate burden of proof under subsection (f) that "the fingerprint 
or DNA evidence must demonstrate that the petitioner is not the person who committed the 
offense," which is to be applied as testing is completed. As previously stated by counsel, "we 
need the testing" to meet subsection (f), but, as Fields illustrates, Sarah can get the testing without 
showing what the results will ultimately be. 
d. Conclusion 
We cannot tell, at this point, whether the evidence will be of an unknown person as in 
Fields or a known person with no connection to Sarah but with a motive to commit the murders. 
If it is the former, that would be evidence of Sarah's innocence since we know that the jury found 
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her to be the shooter because of the jury's finding that she possessed a firearm during the 
commission of the offense. If the testing shows the latter, then Sarah is still likely to be able to 
meet her burden of proof under subsection (f). In either case, at this point we can say that the "the 
result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent" under subsection 
(e)(I). 
This Court should reverse the District Court's orders denying testing. 
B. This Court should overrule Murphy v. State, supra., and remand claims 2-5 
"Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent 
is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. 
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30, 33-34(2015). This is one of those rare cases. 
The District Court dismissed Claims 2-5 because they were barred under Murphy v. State, 
supra., which held that a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not 
"sufficient reason" to permit the filing of a successive post-conviction petition. In so holding, 
Murphy v. State, supra., upset 33 years of settled precedent by overruling Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 
Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981 ). Prior to Murphy and at the time Sarah filed her successive post-
conviction petition, a petitioner could file a second petition if the claims raised were omitted from 
the original petition due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. "In Palmer, this 
Court concluded that an allegation of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may 
provide sufficient reason under § 19-4908 to permit allegations of error at trial not previously 
raised or inadequateiy raised in the initial appiication to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction 
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application." Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho at 394. 327 P.3d at 370. 
In overruling Palmer, the Court reasoned that the underpinning for the Palmer rule had 
been undermined by subsequent cases which established that there was no right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 7 It wrote, "Where there is no right to counsel, there can be no deprivation 
of effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we overrule Palmer and hold that because Murphy 
has no statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she 
cannot demonstrate sufficient reason for filing a successive petition based on ineffectiveness of 
post-conviction counsel." Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371. 
l. Murphy should be overruled because it is manifestly wrong 
Murphy is manifestly wrong because it interprets the statutory phrase "sufficient reason" to 
require a showing of a constitutional violation. Even assuming, arguendo, that there is no 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, there is no textual 
reason to conclude that the Legislature intended the phrase "sufficient reason" to require the 
deprivation of a constitutional right. To the contrary, "[ s]tatutory analysis 'must begin with the 
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; 
and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
7 The Murphy Court puts too much reliance on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 
(1987), and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 ( 1991 ), for its conclusion that there is never a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. As the Supreme Court 
has clarified, Coleman "left open ... a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a 
right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a 
claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Martinez v. Ryan, U.S.-, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 
(2012). Further, the Martinez Court noted that Coleman "suggested, though without holding, 
that the Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings" where such proceedings are the 'one and only appeal' as to an ineffective assistance 
claim .... " Id. In Idaho, ineffective assistance of trial counsei claims can realisticaily only be 
presented through a post-conviction petition. 
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construe it. but simply follows the law as written.'" State v. Neal. No. 42729. 2015 WL 6735793, 
at *4 (Idaho Nov. 4, 2015) quot in?; Ver ska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg 'f l'vfed. Ctr., supra. The plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning of "sufficient cause" is that the circumstances surrounding the failure 
to do an act would make it inequitable to impose a sanction based upon that failure. For example, 
this Court held that "a demonstrated physical inability to perform the requested f alcohol 
concentration] test would be sufficient cause" to avoid a driver's license suspension for a refusal 
to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test. Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 372, 744 P.2d 
92, 100 ( 1987) (fear of needles). The Griffith Court specifically rejected the argument that the 
driver would have to show a constitutional violation, i.e., a "lack of probable cause or a violation 
of defendant's civil rights" in order to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for the refusal. 113 Idaho at 
370, 744 P.2d at 98. See also City of Boise v. Ada Cnty., 147 Idaho 794,804,215 P.3d 514,524 
(2009) ("As a general rule, a final order resulting in the imposition of an injunction will not be 
reconsidered except upon a showing of good and sufficient cause. Good cause may be established 
by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in circumstances has rendered the 
original injunction inequitable.") (Internal citation omitted.) In another case, this Court has 
applied a "sufficient cause" standard without reference to a constitutional violation. Loomis, Inc. 
v. Cudahy, I 04 Idaho I 06, 111, 656 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1982) (sufficient cause to postpone 
arbitration hearing). And, it has found that "a breach of a duty" by the defendant to the plaintiff is 
required before "a sufficient cause of actionable negligence been made out." McKinley v. 
Fanning, I 00 Idaho 189, 194, 595 P.2d I 084, 1089 (1979). Thus, there is no basis in the statutory 
language or the prior caselaw to support the Murphy Court's conclusion that a breach of duty by 
post-conviction counsei can never be ''sufficient reason" to raise issues that attorney omitted in a 
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successive petition. 
Further, the opinion in lvfurphy is illogical because it equates the absence of a 
constitutional cause of action with the absence of statutory sufficient cause. The two are not the 
same. The petitioner in Murphy was not alleging her conviction should be vacated due to the 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she was only arguing she should be able to raise 
those claims a competent post-conviction attorney would have originally raised. The fact that 
there is no statutory or constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel does not mean 
that the deficient performance of post-conviction counsel cannot be a gateway to filing a 
successive petition. In federal habeas cases, for example, there is no "actual innocence" cause of 
action, but a showing of actual innocence may allow a petitioner to overcome the statute of 
limitations or other procedural bars for seeking relief under the "miscarriage of justice" exception 
in federal court. McQuiggin v. Perkins, U.S.-, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013); House v. Bell, 
547 U.S. 518, 536-37, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076-77, 165 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2006)(showing of actual 
innocence acts as a gateway to defaulted claims). The absence of an "actual innocence" cause of 
action does not mean that it cannot be the basis for a finding that it would be a "miscarriage of 
justice" to bar the petition from presenting claims to the court. Substitute "ineffective assistance 
of counsel" for "actual innocence" and "sufficient cause" for "miscarriage of justice" and the 
same is true here. (The reasoning in the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in Bejarano v. Warden, 
112 Nev. 1466, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (1996), which the Murphy Court found "persuasive," suffers 
from the same logical error. 156 Idaho at 394, 327 P.3d at 370.) 
Further. there is no reason to believe that the Palmer Court based its ruling on a belief that 
there was an ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cause of action. The basis for the 
36 
ruling vvas that Palmer's claims had not been knowingly abandoned by him and that was 
'·sufficient reason." The Palmer Court wrote: 
The allegations of ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel, if true, 
would warrant a finding that the omission in the prior post conviction proceeding 
of the allegations now being raised anew by Palmer was not a result ofan active, 
knowing choice made by Palmer through this prior court-appointed attorney, and 
would therefore provide sufficient reason for permitting the newly asserted 
allegations to be raised in the instant petition. Other jurisdictions have similarly 
held that a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or prior 
postconviction counsel provides sufficient reason to permit newly asserted 
allegations to be raised in a subsequent postconviction proceeding. See Sims v. 
State, 295 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1980); Curtis v. State, 37 Md.App. 459,381 A.2d 
1166 (1978) rev'd on other grounds; Stewart v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 92 
Nev. 588,555 P.2d 218 (1976). 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho at 596,635 P.2d at 960 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that 
none of the cases cited by Palmer relied upon the idea that ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel was a constitutional cause of action. In fact, the Maryland Court expressly 
stated that "[t]here is no constitutional right to post conviction relief[.]" Curtis v. State, 381 A.2d 
at 1170. Thus, Murphy overruled Palmer based upon an incorrect understanding of the basis of its 
ruling. 
Also, an unbending rule that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may 
never be a "sufficient reason" is also inconsistent with the discretional nature of the sufficient 
reason inquiry. See Kolp v. Bd. of Trustees of Butte Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. I I I, 102 Idaho 320, 
324,629 P.2d 1153, 1157 (1981) (Mandamus action to challenge school board's determination 
that there was "sufficient cause" to discharge a teacher improper because that determination 
requires the exercise of discretion for which mandamus ordinarily will not lie.) 
Finally, Palmer is consistent with the intent of the Uniform Law. Idaho's post-conviction 
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statute. LC. §§ 19-490 l through -4911, is derived from the first revised version (1966) of the 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act With regard to section 8 of the 1966 Uniform Act 
(which appears as section 19-4908 of the Idaho Code), the Commissioners made it clear that 
successive petitions should be liberally permitted: 
The Supreme Court has directed the lower federal courts to be liberal in 
entertaining successive habeas corpus petitions despite repetition of issues, 
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I (1963). By adopting a similar permissiveness, 
this section will postpone the exhaustion of state remedies available to the 
applicant which Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), holds is required by statute for 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thus, the adjudication of 
meritorious claims will increasingly be accomplished within the state court system. 
1966 UPCPA § 8 cmt., U.L.A. app. II (parallel citations omitted). Accordingly, LC.§ 19-4908 
should be construed in favor of having petitioners' claims considered on their merits. Palmer was 
consistent with the drafter's intent. Murphy is what the drafters wanted to avoid. Palmer's 
interpretation of the "sufficient reason" standard of LC. § 19-4908 was correct when decided and 
subsequent events did not change that. 
In light of the above, it is manifest that Murphy was wrongly decided and this Court 
should overrule it. 
2. Afurphy should be overruled because it is unwise 
In addition, Murphy is unwise because it shifts the duty of adjudicating state cases to the 
federal court. As recently observed by Chief Federal District Judge Winmill: 
Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act generally requires that all claims 
be raised in the initial postconviction petition. See Idaho Code § 19-4908. 
However, the statute allows for claims to be raised in a successive petition if the 
petitioner shows "sufficient reason" why the claim was not raised, or was 
inadequately raised, in the initial petition. Petitioner's argument regarding 
postconviction counsel's failure to amend the initial postconviction petition was 
directed at this exception to the general procedural rule that ail claims not raised in 
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an initial petition are deemed waived. 
At the time of Petitioner's postconviction proceedings. Idaho courts had long held 
that ineffective assistance of initial postconviction counsel could constitute a 
"sufficient reason" under § 19-4908 to allow a petitioner to raise a claim in a 
successive petition. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955, 959-60 (Idaho 1981 ), 
overruled by Murphy v. State, No. 40483, P.3d--, 2014 WL 712695 (Idaho 
Feb. 25, 2014). 
But the Idaho Supreme Court recently reversed course. In Murphy, the comi 
surveyed what it believed to be the current state of federal law on the subject of 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel and determined that, in accord 
with such law, "sufficient reason" under § 19-4908 does not include ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel. Murphy, 2014 WL 712695 at * 5. Though the 
Idaho Supreme Court correctly stated that there is no federal constitutional right 
to post conviction counsel, it did not discuss the fact that under more recent federal 
habeas law, a petitioner may, in fact, assert ineffective assistance of initial 
post conviction counsel as cause to excuse the procedural default of claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 
1309 (2012); Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013); Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 
1287, 1293 (9th Cir.2013) (applying Martinez to underlying claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel). 
Veenstra v. Smith, No. l:1 I-CV-00632-BLW, 2014 WL 1270626, at *3 (D. Idaho Mar. 26, 2014) 
(unpublished). 
The unintended consequence of Murphy is that it has given the federal courts the 
opportunity to decide state ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims as an 
original matter, when under Palmer the claims would have had to be raised in a successive 
petition and ruled upon by the state courts before they could be raised in federal court. As a 
matter of state judicial policy, state trial courts should be resolving allegations that state trials 
were not fair. State appellate courts should review those rulings. And, the federal courts should 
only overturn those decisions when petitioners can overcome the highly deferential standard of 
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federal court review applied to exhausted claims. Sec 28 U.S. C. 2254( d)8. However under 
Murphy, ineffective assistance claims, which would have previously been decided in state court, 
are now being raised in federal court under Martinez. J\nd. the federal court may review these 
claims de nova because there are no state courts findings of facts or conclusions of law for the 
federal court to defer to. 
As Judge Winmill explains: 
Martinez v. Ryan worked a "remarkable" equitable change in the law governing 
procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Lopez v. Ryan, 
678 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir.2012). Martinez altered the long-standing 
prohibition of Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, I 11 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 
640 (1991), that post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness could not be used to 
excuse the procedural default of a claim. In effect, Martinez created the potential 
for an exception to the overall ban on new evidence in§ 2254 actions that was 
pronounced in Cullen v. Pinholster, -U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 
557 (2011) (interpreting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA)). Martinez makes it possible for procedurally defaulted ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims to be heard de nova, with new supporting 
evidence, on federal habeas corpus review. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d at 1320 
("We reject any argument that Pinholster bars the federal district court's ability to 
consider Dickens's 'new' IAC claim." In addition, "Pinholster says nothing about 
whether a court may consider a 'new' claim, based on 'new' evidence not 
previously presented to the state courts. 
Row v. Beauclair, No. 1:98-CV-00240-BLW, 2015 WL 1481416, at *2 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2015) 
(unpublished) ( emphasis added). 
8 That provision states, 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(!) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
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It is unwise relinquish state sovereignty by letting the federal courts do the work the state 
courts have traditionally done and allowing the federal courts to hear evidence never presented to 
the state court and using that evidence to rule on claims never presented to the state courts. This 
Court should restore the proper division of authority between the state and federal systems. 
Murphy should be overruled so that state court petitioners may file a successive state petition 
presenting claims which were omitted from the original petition due to the ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel as they could under Palmer. 
3. Claims 2-5 should be remanded for further proceedings 
If Murphy is overruled, the Court should remand claims 2-5 so the District Court may 
determine whether sufficient reasons exists to raise them in this successive petition. 
C. The District Court erred in dismissing the Miller claim 
As noted above, the District Court denied the Eighth Amendment claim because Sarah did 
not raise it in prior proceedings. It further held that Miller has not been found retroactive and 
moreover does not apply in Idaho. DNA R pp. 248-252. 
1. Standard of review 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate court exercises free 
review. State v. McKean, supra. Questions of constitutional interpretation are reviewed de novo. 
See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,273, 92 P.3d 521,523 (2004). 
2. The Miller claim was not waived 
Sarah did not waive her Eighth Amendment claim by not raising it in her direct appeal or 
first post-conviction petition. The claim is based upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v. 
Alabama, U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), which was not decided until June 25, 2012, six years 
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after Sarah filed her original petition for post-conviction relief (CV-2006-324) on April 19, 2006, 
and four years after the opinion in her direct appeal was issued. In fact judgment was entered by 
the District Court in the post-conviction proceeding on April 8, 2011, and the case was on appeal 
before this Court when Miller was issued. Clearly, she could not have raised her 1vfiller claim on 
direct appeal or in her first petition. 
Sarah filed this case on April 9, 2012, two months before Miller was decided. And she 
raised her Miller claim when she filed her Amended DNA and Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief on January 22, 2014, while the appeal in her first post-conviction case was still 
pending. (This Court did not issue its opinion in the appeal from the first petition until February 
20, 2014, and the case was not remitted until March 26, 2014.) 
Since Sarah filed this petition prior to the final decision in her original petition, this 
petition is timely. As set out in Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008): 
The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that an application for 
post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. The appeal 
referenced in that section means the appeal in the underlying criminal case. The 
failure to file a timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. 
However, if an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been 
concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year 
limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient 
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or 
amended application. 
145 Idaho at 189, 177 P.3d at 403 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The successive 
petition must be filed within a reasonable amount of time. What is a reasonable amount of time is 
to be considered on a case by case basis. Id., at 190, 177 P.3d at 404, citing Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). However, the Court of Appeais has found that a 
42 
successive petition filed one year after the decision on the appeal from the original petition was 
timely. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789. 794 (Ct. App. 1999). Here Sarah 
raised her Miller claim before her post-conviction appeal was decided and is timely under 
Hernandez. Moreover, she amended her successive petition in a reasonable amount of time as the 
State had not yet filed an answer and she was permitted to amend the petition as a matter of 
course. I.R.C.P. 15(a). 
Further, the fact that Miller was not decided until after both her original and successive 
petition had been filed is "sufficient reason" to permit her to raise the claim in her amended 
successive petition under LC. § 19-4908. As explained in detail below, Miller created a 
substantive change in Eighth Amendment law, especially as the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause had been interpreted in Idaho. For example, this Court affirmed the imposition of a fixed-
life sentence on a sixteen-year-old defendant in State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 
(2011). In doing so, the Court held that "the nature and the gravity of the underlying offense may, 
standing alone, be sufficient to justify a determinate life sentence." 159 Idaho at 880, 253 P.3d at 
317. That position was squarely rejected by the Miller Court as it applies to fixed life sentences 
imposed uponjuveniles and consequently Windom was overruled in part by Afiller. 
The Windom case was cited by the Court in affirming two other juvenile fixed-life cases, 
both prior to the issuance of Miller. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 599, 261 P.3d 853, 876 
(2011) ("We hold that Draper's fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the United States Constitution."); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 487, 272 
P.3d 417,459 (2012) ("[T]he gravity of the first-degree murder ... supports the severity of his 
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r life sentence.'}1 
The substantive change in the law under Miller provides sufficient reason for the filing of 
a successive petition. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed a lvfiller claim to be raised in a fourth 
petition for post-conviction relief because Miller was not available to the defendant either on 
direct appeal or in his previous post-conviction petitions. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 
2014), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Davis, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014). In Illinois, a successive 
post-conviction may not be filed unless the petitioner establishes "cause" for the failure to raise 
and "prejudice" resulting therefrom. The Davis Court found that "Miller's new substantive rule 
constitutes 'cause' because it was not available earlier to counsel and constitutes prejudice 
because it retroactively applies to defendant's sentencing hearing." People v. Davis, 6 N.E.Jd at 
722. 
Further, this claim is not barred by Murphy v. State, supra. Sarah does not claim she can 
raise the Miller claim now because original post-conviction counsel was ineffective. She can 
raise the claim now because it was not available to her during her direct appeal or during her post-
conviction proceedings because Miller had not yet been decided and Miller announced a new 
substantive rule of law which requires a new sentencing hearing here. 
3. Miller applies to this case 
a. Miller v. Alabama 
In Miller, the Supreme Court held two things. First, it held that mandatory fixed life 
sentencing provisions may not be applied to juveniles. It also directed that a sentencing court 
9 Sarah believes that Ethan Windom, Brian Draper and Torey Adamcik are the only other 
juveniles who have been sentenced to fixed life terms in Idaho. 
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must undertake an analysis of"fe]verything [it] said in Roper and Graham" about youth and 
impose juvenile life without parole (JL WOP) sentences only in rare cases. Miller, 567 U.S. at 
--, 132 S.Ct. at 2467. In reaching its decision, the Court clarified that "imposition of a State's 
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children." 
132 S.Ct. at 2466. The Court further clarified that "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles 
to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon" and indicated that the penalty is only 
appropriate for "the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects ineparable conuption." 132 S.Ct. 
at 24 70. Moreover, as noted in the dissents of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice 
Ali to, the prohibition against fixed life sentences will likely soon be extended to all juvenile 
offenders, including those convicted of homicide in states which do not mandate fixed life terms. 
132 S.Ct. at 2481, 2486, 2489-90. 
Miller relied on two prior cases: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which 
invalidated the death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age of 18; and Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), which invalidated life without parole sentences 
imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders. 
In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty cannot be applied to juveniles. In 
reaching this decision, the Court looked to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society." 543 U.S. at 561. To measure this evolution, the Court looked 
not only at the number of states that allowed executions of juveniles, but also at the consistency of 
the direction of change in state laws. 543 U.S. at 566. The Court also looked to the laws of other 
countries and to the international authorities as instructive. 543 U.S. at 574. Lastly, the Court 
brought its own independent judgment to bear on the proportionaiity of the penaity for a particuiar 
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class of crimes or class of offenders. Id 
Graham and Miller likewise looked to the evolving standards of decency, as evidenced by 
state laws, direction of change in state laws, and international standards as well as the Court's own 
independent judgment. 
In exercising its own judgment, the Court considered several factors. First, the Court 
made clear in Roper that society views juveniles as "categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal." 543 U.S. at 567. The Court also cited three general differences between juveniles and 
adults that demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the 
worst offenders: 1) as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies confirm, 
juveniles are less mature and responsible than adults; 2) juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and 3) the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. 543 U.S. at 569-70. The Court 
concluded that [t]hese differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the 
worst offenders." 543 U.S. at 570. "The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity 
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is 
evidence of irretrievably depraved character." Id. In short, juveniles have a lesser culpability than 
adults. And, this lesser culpability affects the analysis of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation 
- retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose 
culpability is diminished by reason of youth and immaturity. And, rehabilitation is more likely as 
"the signature qualities of youth are transient." 543 U.S. at 570-71. Children grow up. 
Roper adopted a categorical prohibition against the death penalty for juveniles because of 
the difficuities in judging and predicting injuveniie cases. The Court noted the likelihood that the 
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''brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments 
based on youth as a matter of course" and remarked that in some cases, it is even possible that the 
defendant's youth would wrongly be counted against him or her. 543 U.S. at 573. The Court 
concluded that even trained psychiatrists do not diagnose patients under age 18 as having 
antisocial personality disorder - and that if trained professionals do not believe that they can 
determine that a youth is irreparably depraved, then states cannot ask jurors to make that 
determination and extinguish the life and potential for a mature understanding of one's own 
humanity for anyone under age 18 by imposing the death penalty. Id. 
Graham applied the same analytic framework to life without possibility of parole 
sentences as had been applied to death penalty sentences in Roper. In doing so, the Court noted 
that life without parole is an especially harsh penalty for a juvenile - a harsher penalty than the 
same sentence imposed on an adult because a juvenile will spend more years and a greater 
proportion of his or her life in prison than an adult. "This reality cannot be ignored." 130 S.Ct. at 
2028. 
The Court noted that life without possibility of parole sentences are like death penalty 
sentences in that they alter the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. The sentence 
"deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope ofrestoration, except perhaps 
by executive clemency - the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the 
sentence." 130 S.Ct. at 2027. "This sentence 'means denial of hope; it means that good behavior 
and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store 
for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days."' Id., 
quoting Naovaralh v. S'tate, 779 P.2d 944, 996 (Nev. 1989). 
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The Court also noted that the developments in psychology and brain science since Roper 
continued to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. "Juveniles are 
more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 
'irretrievably depraved character' than are the actions of adults." 130 S.Ct. at 2026, citing Roper. 
From both a scientific and a moral standpoint it is misguided to equate the actions of a juvenile 
with those of an adult. Id. 
In determining that the proper result was a categorical prohibition on fixed life sentences 
for non-homicide juvenile offenders, the Court looked at the penological justifications for 
sentencing and held that none - retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation - provides 
an adequate justification for the harsh sentence. The Court held that retribution does not justify 
imposition of the penalty because juveniles are less culpable than adults. 130 S.Ct. at 2028. 
Deterrence does not justify the sentence because the same characteristics that render juveniles less 
culpable than adults also make them less susceptible to deterrence. 130 S.Ct. at 2028-29. 
Incapacitation does not justify the sentence because the characteristics of juveniles make the 
judgment that a specific youth is incorrigible and can never be safely in the community again 
questionable. "A life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to 
demonstrate growth and maturity." 130 S.Ct. at 2029. And finally, rehabilitation does not justify 
the penalty because the penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. 130 S.Ct. at 2030. 
Noting an on-going concern with the "unacceptable likelihood" that the brutality or cold-
blooded nature of a particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a 
matter of course, the Graham Court determined both that a criminal procedure that failed to take 
into account the defendant's youth is constitutionally flawed and further that a categorical 
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prohibition against mandatory fixed life sentences was the proper course. 130 S.Ct. at 2030-2032. 
In Miller, the Court again applied the same analytical framework - noting Graham's 
foundational principle: "that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders 
cannot proceed as though they were not children." 132 S.Ct. at 2466. And, Miller emphasized 
that this is true in all cases - even in cases involving vicious murders. 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 
Afiller concluded: 
We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Cf 
Graham, 560 U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 2030 (' A State is not required to guarantee 
eventual freedom,' but must provide 'some meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation'). By making youth (and 
all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, 
such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. Because that 
holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider Jackson's and 
Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar 
on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger. But given 
all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children's diminished 
culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is 
especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of 
distinguishing at this early age between 'the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption. ' Roper, 543 US. at 57 3, 125 S. Ct. at 1183; 
Graham, 560 US. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 2026-2027. Although we do not foreclose a 
sentencer 's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take 
into account how children are different and how those differences counsel against 
irrevocably sentencing them to a l[fetime in prison. 
132 S.Ct. at 2469 ( emphasis added). 
Miller requires more than a generalized notion of taking age into consideration as a factor 
in sentencing. A sentencing court's passing reference to the defendant's youth does not eliminate 
need to resentence in light of Miller requirements. Sentencing courts are now required to apply 
the core teachings of Roper, Graham, and Miller in making sentencing decisions. See e.g., State 
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v. S'immons. 99 So.Jc! 28, 28 (La. 2012) (per curiam) (remanding to the district court for 
reconsideration of the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without possibility 
parole imposed in 1995 in light of Miller and requiring the court to make findings on the 
record); and S'tate v. Fletcher, 112 So.3d 1031, 1036 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that while 
sentencing court considered some of the factors enumerated in Miller, the court's consideration 
lacked depth). 
In light of Miller, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated a mandatory juvenile fixed life 
sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d. 41 (Iowa 2013) In Null, the 
Iowa Court wrote that the district court must recognize that because "children are constitutionally 
different from adults," they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as adults 
in criminal sentencing due to the juvenile's lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, and the less fixed nature of the juvenile's character." 
836 N. W.2d at 74, citing lv!iller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. And, if a sentencing court believes a case 
presents an exception to this generally applicable rule, the court should make findings discussing 
why the general rule does not apply. Id., citing Simmons, 99 So.3d at 28; Fletcher, 112 So.3d at 
1036-37. 
"Second, the district court must recognize that '[j]uveniles are more capable of change 
than are adults' and that as a result, 'their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'inetrievably 
depraved character."' 836 N. W.2d at 75, citing Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, in turn quoting Roper, 
543 U.S. at 570; accord Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. And, "the district court must recognize that 
most juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not destined to become lifelong criminals." 
Id., citing lvfiiler, 132 S.Ct. at 2464; Graham, I 30 S.Ct. at 2029; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. in other 
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words, the "'signature qualities' of youth are all 'transient.'" 1Hiller. 132 S.Ct. at 2467, quoting 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 ( 1993). Because "incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth," 
care should be taken to avoid "an irrevocable judgment about [ an offender's] value and place in 
society." Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2465. 
Finally, "the district court should recognize that a lengthy prison sentence without the 
possibility of parole such as that involved in this case is appropriate, if at all, only in rare or 
uncommon cases." Null, supra, citing Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 
b. Miller applies to non-mandatory JLWOP sentences 
While the Alabama statute in Miller mandated a fixed life sentence, Miller also applies to 
non-mandatory sentencing schemes. The Connecticut Supreme Court applied Miller to its non-
mandatory sentencing scheme, writing that: 
[W]e conclude that Miller does not stand solely for the proposition that the eighth 
amendment demands that the sentencer have discretion to impose a lesser 
punishment than life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender. Rather, 
Miller logically indicates that, if a sentencing scheme permits the imposition of 
that punishment on a juvenile homicide offender, the trial court must consider the 
offender's "chronological age and its hallmark features as mitigating against such a 
severe sentence. Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2468. As the court in 
Miller explained, those features include: "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences"; the offender's "family and home environment" 
and the offender's inability to extricate himself from that environment; "the 
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of[the offender's] 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected him"; the offender's "inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors 
(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys"; and 
"the possibility ofrehabilitation .... " Id. 
State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1216 (Conn. 2015). Other state appellate courts have also found 
that Miller applies to non-mandatory sentencing schemes. See e.g., Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 
572,577 (S.C. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015) ("Miller does more than ban mandatory 
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life sentencing schemes for juveniles; it establishes an affirmative requirement that courts fully 
explore the impact of the defendant'sjuvenility on the sentence rendered.''): People v. Gutierrez, 
324 P .3d 245 (Cal. 2014) ("[ u ]nder lvfiller, a state may authorize its courts to impose life without 
parole on a juvenile homicide offender when the penalty is discretionary and when the sentencing 
court's discretion is properly exercised in accordance with lvli!ler "); Daugherty v. State, 96 So.3d 
1076, 1079 (Fla. App. 2012) (Miller applies to discretionary scheme). See also, Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney, l N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013) ( concluding that discretionary scheme allowing 
imprisonment without parole for juvenile offender violates state constitution but relying on 
reasoning of Graham and Roper in so concluding); State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014) (The 
court initially stated that "Ohio's sentencing scheme does not fall afoul of Miller, because the 
sentence oflife without parole is discretionary" but later stated: "Because the trial court did not 
separately mention that [the defendant] was a juvenile when he committed the offense, we cannot 
be sure how the trial court applied this factor. Although Miller does not require that specific 
findings be made on the record, it does mandate that a trial court consider as mitigating the 
offender's youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a sentence of life without 
parole." [Emphasis omitted.]). 
Thus, Miller's limitation on JL WOP sentences to a small class of juvenile offenders and 
its requirement that the sentencing court fully consider the effect of the defendant's juvenility at 
sentencing applies to Idaho sentencing proceedings. 
4. Miller applies retroactively to this case 
A1iller applies retroactively to Sarah's case. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the 
United States Supreme Court set out its retroactivity doctrine, in which new constitutional rules 
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typically are applied to cases pending on direct review but are not retroactive to cases on collateral 
review. Teague identified two exceptions to that rule: A new rule should be applied retroactively 
if (1) it is "substantive," - that is, ·'it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"; or (2) "it requires the 
observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"- that is, it is 
a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure. Id. at 307, 311 (plurality). 
This Court adopted the Teague retroactivity test in Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139, 
233 P.3d 61, 70 (2010), but also held that pursuant to Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 
267-69 (2008), that it was not required to simply follow the Supreme Court's view of what 
constitutes a new rule or whether a new rule is a watershed rule. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 
P.3d at 70. The Court noted that although the United States Supreme Court has strictly interpreted 
Teague in order to avoid excessive interference by federal habeas courts in state criminal 
convictions that have become final, Idaho courts do "not have a similar concern for comity when 
interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of applying Teague." 
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70. Rather, the Court held, in considering whether to give 
retroactive effect to a rule of law, Idaho courts should "reflect independent judgment, based upon 
the concerns of this Court and the 'uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our 
long-standing jurisprudence.'" Id., quoting State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,472, 20 P.3d 5, 8 
(200 I). 
a. The retroactivity issue is currently pending before the United States Supreme 
Court. 
The retroactivity question is pending before the Supreme Court. See Montgomery v. 
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Louisiana. 13 5 S. Ct. 1546 (2015) (granting Montgomery's petition for writ of certiorari.) It 
seems likely that the Supreme Court will find Miller to be retroactive since it granted relief in 
Miller's companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs, -U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), which was on 
state collateral review. See Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011) rev'd and remanded 
sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, supra. 
However, in addition to the retroactivity question, the Montgomery Court directed the 
parties to brief and argue the following question: "Do we have jurisdiction to decide whether the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect in this case to our decision 
in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. -- (2012)?" Thus, it is possible that the Supreme Court will not 
reach the merits of the retroactivity issue. The case was argued on October 13, 2015. 
b. Irrespective of the decision in Montgomery, this Court should find Miller 
retroactive because Miller announced a new substantive rule 10 
No matter how the United States Supreme Court rules, this Court should find that Miller is 
retroactive. While Miller set out a procedural mechanism designed to make decisions more 
accurate, it also changed the substance of Eighth Amendment doctrine regarding what 
punishments are cruel and unusual for juveniles. It is a case about proportionality under the Eighth 
Amendment. See 132 S. Ct. at 2463 ( explaining that the Eighth Amendment embodies "the basic 
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the 
offender and the offense") (internal quotation marks omitted). And, it addressed whether, and 
10 This section of the brief is a modified version of the Brief for the American Bar 
Association in Support of the Petitioner in Montgomery v. Louisiana, Supreme Court Dkt 14-
280. www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme court preview/ 
briefs 2015 2016/14-280 amicus pet AmericanBar Association.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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under what circumstances, life without the possibility of parole could be a proportional-and hence 
constitutional-sentence for offenders who committed their crimes as juveniles. The Court 
explained that this question "implicate[ s] two strands of precedent reflecting our concern with 
proportionate punishment." Id. 
The first strand of precedent included decisions like Roper ( death penalty may not be 
imposed on juveniles), and Graham (life without parole may not be imposed on juveniles who did 
not commit homicide), which "establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. "Because juveniles have diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform," Roper and Graham hold that "they are less 
deserving of the most severe punishments." Id. at 2464 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Specifically, "children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, 
leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). They "are more vulnerable ... to negative influences and outside pressures." Id. And, 
perhaps most significantly here, "a child's character is not as well formed as an adult's; h[er] traits 
are less fixed and h[ er] actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). Those "distinctive attributes of youth diminish the 
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when 
they commit terrible crimes." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Because minors are less blameworthy, 
"the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Moreover, juveniles' "immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity" mean that they 
are unlikely to be deterred by "potential punishment." Id. Finally, a sentence of life without 
parole requires "making a judgment that [ s ]he is incorrigible-but incorrigibility is inconsistent 
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with youth." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). For all these reasons, 
"life-without-parole sentences ... may violate the Eighth Amendment" -that is, the Eighth 
Amendment's substantive guarantee that punishment will be proportional to the crime- "when 
imposed on children."' Id. 
Because Miller viewed a life without parole sentence for a juvenile as analogous to a death 
sentence-the harshest possible available sentence, which mandates that the juvenile offender will 
die in prison, the Court also relied on a second strand of precedent. Those decisions require "that 
capital defendants have an opportunity to advance, and the judge or jury a chance to assess, any 
mitigating factors, so that the death penalty is reserved only for the most culpable defendants 
committing the most serious offenses." 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 
66, 74-76(1987);Eddingsv. Oklahoma,455U.S.104, 110-12(1982);Lockettv. Ohio,438U.S. 
586 (1978)); see id. at 2464 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). "In light 
of Graham's reasoning," the Court explained, "these decisions too show the flaws of imposing 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide offenders .... Such mandatory 
penalties ... preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of 
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it," by applying the same sentence to all juvenile 
and adult offenders alike regardless of culpability or the likelihood of change in the future. Id. at 
2467-68. Synthesizing these two lines of precedent, the Court held that "the Eighth Amendment 
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. "By making youth ... irrelevant to the imposition 
of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment." Id. Indeed, the Court noted, "given all we have said ... about children's diminished 
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culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing 
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the 
great difficulty ... of distinguishing at this early age between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
While Idaho is not a mandatory fixed life sentence state, Miller also held that the inherent 
characteristics of juvenile offenders - even those who have committed homicides - will typically 
render a sentence of life without parole unconstitutionally disproportionate. It required sentencing 
judges to give meaningful consideration to the characteristics of youth before imposing life 
without parole on a juvenile precisely because of the "great ... risk of disproportionate 
punishment" that would otherwise exist. Id. Thus, both of Miller's holdings are "substantive" 
for retroactivity purposes. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court clarified that the 
first Teague exception applies to "substantive categorical guarantees accorded by the 
Constitution." Id. at 329. For instance, where "the Eighth Amendment, as a substantive matter, 
prohibits imposing the death penalty on a certain class of defendants because of their status, or 
because of the nature of their offense," the rule should be retroactive. Id. at 329- 30. That is so 
because "the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and 
the finality and comity concerns underlying [the general rule of nonretroactivity] have little force." 
Id. at 330. More recently, in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), the Court gave additional 
content to the distinction between substantive constitutional guarantees, which apply retroactively, 
and merely procedural rules, which do not. "New substantive rules generally apply retroactively," 
"because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that 
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the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." Id 
at 351-52 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put differently, "'[aJ rule is substantive rather than 
procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes." Schriro, 
542 U.S. at 353. Under these principles, Miller's holding is a substantive rule. Although it did not 
categorically bar life without parole sentences for juveniles, it nonetheless recognizes a 
"substantive ... guarantee accorded by the Constitution," Penry, 492 U.S. at 329-the guarantee 
that, under the Eighth Amendment, life without parole may be imposed only on "the rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. In Schriro's 
terms, Miller's holding is substantive because there is "a significant risk that [ a juvenile] 
defendant" sentenced before Miller "faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." 
542 U.S. at 352. As Schriro explained, "this Court's making a certain fact essential to the death 
penalty ... would be substantive," and such a holding would be retroactive. 542 U.S. at 354. 
Here, Miller has effectively made certain facts essential to the constitutional imposition of life 
without parole on juveniles. Before Miller, every juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could 
constitutionally be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole without the 
sentencing court even considering the special mitigating qualities of youth. After Miller, such a 
sentence is permitted only in the "rare" and "uncommon" case in which the juvenile's crime and 
character reflect irreparable corruption. Outside of that exceptional case, everyone serving a 
sentence of mandatory life in prison without parole for crimes committed as a juvenile is now 
serving a sentence that the state may not lawfully impose. Because Miller addressed the scope of 
the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, Miller established a 
substantive rule under the Eighth Amendment -- because it limits the range of punishment a state 
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may impose on a specific offender. 
The Eighth Amendment cases on which kfiller relied bolster this point. Roper, Graham, 
and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring the death penalty for the intellectually 
disabled), have all been applied retroactively. See e.g., In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258,262 (5th Cir. 
2011) (acknowledging that Roper has been given retroactive effect); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 
1184, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Thus, we hold that Graham is retroactive under Teague."); Bell v. 
Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (511i Cir. 2002) (holding that Atkins applies retroactively to collateral 
attacks, including habeas relief). Roper, Graham, and Atkins are cases in which the Court held 
that "the Eighth Amendment, as a substantive matter, prohibits imposing the death penalty [ or life 
without parole J on a certain class of defendants because of their status"-Penry's archetype of a 
substantive rule. 492 U.S. at 329-30. Miller's rule likewise reflects a new understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment's substantive guarantee; the only difference between Miller and Roper, 
Graham, and Atkins is that 1\1iller held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing life 
without parole on juveniles, not categorically, but in all but the very rare cases. 
Miller's statement that it did not "categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders" does 
not render the rule in Miller non-substantive. kfiller itself makes clear that a new rule need not be 
categorical to be substantive. A new rule under which life without parole is only rarely a 
proportionate sentence for juvenile offenders is just as substantive as a new rule under which it is 
never a proportionate sentence. In both cases, failure to apply the rule retroactively creates "a 
significant risk that a defendant ... faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." 
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. 
Miller's substantive nature is made clear when its holding is applied to Idaho JL WOP 
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sentencing appeals. While Sarah did not raise a challenge to her sentence in her direct appeal, this 
Court wrote in State v. Windom, that "we reiterate that, in appropriate cases, a district court may 
impose a dete1minate life sentence based upon the egregiousness of the crime." 150 Idaho at 876, 
253 P.3d at 313. In doing so, the Windom Court cited to State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 
610 (1991), a case where the defendant was an adult. The Enno Court held, "Although the 
sentence is a fixed life sentence with no possibility of parole, we find no abuse in the trial court's 
decision. Considering the heinous and cruel nature of the crime and that capital punishment was 
available to the trial court as an alternative based on the aggravating circumstances that were 
found, the trial court's decision is reasonable and within the maximum statutory limits allowed." 
Id. at 409, 807 P.2d at 627. Under Miller, however, a juvenile cannot be sentenced to fixed life 
based solely upon the egregiousness of the crime. A JL WOP sentence may only be imposed on 
"the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption," and then only after the 
sentencing court has "take[ n] into account how children are different, and how those differences 
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Miller, 132 S. Ct., at 2469. 
As this Court noted in State v. Adamcik: "In State v. Windom, this Court recently upheld the 
determinate life sentence of a minor, based solely upon the nature and gravity of the offense." 
152 Idaho at 484, 272 P.3d at 456 ( emphasis added). Thus, Miller modifies Windom on 
substantive Eighth Amendment grounds. See also, State v. Draper, 151 Idaho at 600,261 P.3d 
876 ("We hold that Draper's fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
under the United States Constitution ..... 'When reviewing a fixed life sentence, the primary 
factors considered are the gravity of the offense and/or the need to protect society from the 
defendant.' Windom, 150 Idaho at 876,253 P.3d at 313."): Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 487,272 P.3d 
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417, 459 (2012) (Holding that "Adamcik's fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under Article I, section 6 of Idaho's Constitution because no gross 
disproportionality exists in this case," and stating that, "as noted above, a fixed life sentence for a 
minor was just recently upheld in State v. Windom.") Miller makes a substantive change in 
Idaho's law on juvenile fixed life sentences and thus should be applied retroactively. 
Many state courts have found that Miller is retroactive because it created a new 
substantive rule. See e.g., Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (S.C. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 23 79 (2015) ("We conclude Miller creates a new, substantive rule and should therefore apply 
retroactively. The rule plainly excludes a certain class of defendants-juveniles-from specific 
punishment-life without parole absent individualized considerations of youth. Failing to apply 
the lvfiller rule retroactively risks subjecting defendants to a legally invalid punishment). Aiken is 
instructive here because South Carolina, like Idaho, does not have a mandatory life sentence 
scheme. The Supreme Court denied South Carolina's petition for writ of certiorari. Id See also, 
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015) (mandatory state); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 
716 (Neb. 2014); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 
703 (Miss. 2013) ("We are of the opinion that Miller created a new, substantive rule which should 
be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review."); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for 
Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, (Mass. 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013); 
see also Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
Thus, the first Teague exception to non-retroactivity is present here. 
c. Miller is also retroactive because it announced a watershed rule of criminal 
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procedur/ 1 
Even if this Court classifies lvfiller as procedural, the decision is still retroactive as a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure. In requiring an individualized sentencing hearing that 
provides consideration of a defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances before sentencing 
juvenile offenders to die in prison, the Miller Court stated that such sentences would and should 
be rare. 132 S. Ct., at 2469. The corollary of this assumption is that sentencing juvenile offenders 
to life without parole without these procedural protections is fundamentally unfair and 
impermissibly unreliable. Miller's new rule of individualized sentencing is therefore cognizable 
on collateral review. 
The Teague Court defined "watershed rules" as those "implicating the fundamental 
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (citation omitted). 
Miller satisfies both components. The Miller requirement of individualized sentencing for youth 
facing life imprisonment is a bedrock procedural guarantee necessary for fundamentally fair 
sentencings. That guarantee is more than fundamental "in some abstract sense," id.; it necessarily 
improves the reliability with which Idaho courts identify the uncommon juvenile that society may 
condemn to a death in prison. Thus, lvfiller is an accuracy-enhancing rule under Teague. Miller's 
commitment and contribution to sentencing accuracy for juveniles is beyond doubt. It is now 
abundantly clear that youth always matters in deciding whether to deny a juvenile any hope of 
release from prison. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. And it strictly guides the sentencer's discretion 
11 This section of the brief is a modified version of the Brief for the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Louisiana in Support of the Petitioner in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, Supreme Court Dkt 14-280. www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
supreme court preview/ briefs 2015 2016/14-280 pet amicus AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion. 
authcheckdam.pdf. 
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with the obligation to consider the juvenile·s youth and related mitigation and find irreparable 
corruption on the part of the juvenile before denying all possibility of release. These protections 
are meant to ensure that the ultimate penalty for juveniles is "reserved only for the most culpable 
defendants committing the most serious offenses." Id. at 2467. 
Miller's insistence that the sentencing court consider specific factors and its expectation 
that JL WOP sentences be rarely imposed also satisfies Teague' s insistence that a watershed rule 
"implicate the fundamental fairness" of a sentencing proceeding. Teague, 489 U.S. at 312. As 
with a criminal trial, a sentencing free from constitutional error at the time it became final may 
typically be presumed fundamentally fair. Teague recognized, however, "that time and growth in 
social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory 
process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be 
found to vitiate the fairness of a particular (sentence]." Id. at 311 ( 1989) ( citations and quotations 
omitted). Precisely such an alteration occurred in Miller. Given Miller's recognition that society's 
"evolving standards of decency" for humane punishment have come to reject automatically 
sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without parole, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, courts can no longer 
take for granted the fairness of a fixed life sentence, regardless of when the sentence became final, 
even in cases where the facts of the offense are aggravated. To the contrary, these sentences must 
be regarded as fundamentally unfair, since the sentencers did not have the benefit of the 
sentencing guidance provided by the Miller Court. 
Miller was truly a sea change. The Court had never before recognized the right to 
individualized sentencing for any class of noncapital defendants. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 995 (1991) ("Our cases creating and clarifying the ·individuaiized capital sentencing 
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doctrine' have repeatedly suggested that there is no comparable requirement outside the capital 
context, because of the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.") Indeed, the 
Court had squarely rejected in Harmelin the contention that a noncapital sentence could become 
cruel and unusual by virtue of being mandatory. Id. Justice Thomas, in a dissent to kfiller joined 
by Justice Scalia, objected that the Court's decision in Harmelin precluded the result in Miller. 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2485-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Miller majority responded to this with 
the revelation - forged from Graham and Roper - that "if (as Harmelin recognized) 'death is 
different,' children are different too." Id. at 2470 (emphasis added). Miller essentially carved out 
a juvenile exception to Harmelin. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 24 70. Thus, it represents a watershed 
moment in criminal procedure. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311- 12. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut recently found Miller to have announced a watershed rule. Casiano v. Comm'r of 
Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 69, 115 A.3d 1031, 1041 (2015) ("We further conclude that the rule in 
Miller is a watershed rule of criminal procedure for purposes of our court's application of the 
second exception of Teague.) 
Recognizing Miller as a watershed rule also accords with the spirit of Teague's finality 
concerns with enforcing new procedural rules on collateral review. The Teague plurality found 
that federal collateral review exists mainly to incentivize state compliance with contemporary 
constitutional procedure. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-07. With the limited provenance of habeas 
review, the "costs imposed upon the State[ s] by retroactive application of new rules of 
constitutional law on habeas corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application." 
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,242 (1990) (citation omitted). This balance of interests does not 
hold with lv!i/ler. The decision's roots in society's "evolving standards" of decency tip the scales 
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decisively against finality and in favor of sentencing fairness. That is why Atkins v. Virginia, is 
retroactive. Of course, this Com1's concern with upsetting the finality of its own court's sentences 
is not as strong as the federal court's federalism concerns about interfering with a different 
sovereign's judgment. And as a practical matter, retroactive application of Miller will have a 
small effect on the District Court. To Sarah's knowledge, only four juveniles, including herself, 
are serving fixed life sentences in Idaho. At the same time, all four have an undeniably significant 
liberty interest in collateral review to reduce their inherently disproportionate sentences. As the 
Arkansas Supreme Court recently wrote: 
We are not unmindful of the State's arguments regarding fairness to those involved 
in and affected by Gordon's trial and sentencing. The State argues that Gordon 
received a fair trial and lawful sentence at the time of his conviction, and it would 
upset the expectations of all involved to vacate his sentence and have a new 
sentencing proceeding. Furthermore, the State argues that the costs, both in 
resources and human suffering, particularly that of the victim's family, should not 
be forgotten. These are compelling interests, but we hold that the Eighth 
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment outweighs the factors favoring 
finality. 
Kelley v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, 7,465 S.W.3d 842, 846 (2015), reh 'g denied (Sept. I 0, 2015). 
Likewise, the costs to Idaho courts in retroactively enforcing Miller should not (indeed cannot) 
outweigh this fundamental interest in freedom from cruel and unusual punishments. 
Again, the Miller Court's comparison of juvenile life without parole with the death penalty 
is instructive. Finality concerns did not prevent the Court from retroactively voiding death 
sentences after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and they surely would not have 
prevented the Court from retroactively halting the execution of mandatory death sentences after 
Woodson, despite the institution of capital punishment surviving both decisions. It is similarly 
unfathomable that this Court would ail ow Sarah ( or Ethan, or Brian, or Torey) to die in prison 
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after Miller, without first getting the now required full consideration at sentencing, simply because 
she has the misfortune of being on collateral review. 
5. Under the logic of Miller, JL WOP sentences are categoricailv unconstitutional under 
the Eighth Amendment. 
The two fixed life sentences imposed upon Sarah violate the Eighth Amendment because 
fixed life sentences for juveniles are categorically impermissible. As noted above, the dissenters in 
}.;filler all noted that Miller is "an invitation to overturn life without parole sentences" and that the 
prohibition will likely soon extend to all fixed life sentences even for homicides and even in states 
which allow judicial discretion. 132 S.Ct. at 248 (Thomas, J., dissenting). All the bases for 
finding the sentences unconstitutional in Miller including the trend of state laws, international 
law, and the Court's own judgment, will be applied to find JL WOP sentences unconstitutional 
regardless of what sentencing discretion is given to the trial court. It is worth noting that a 
petition for writ of certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Louisiana, 
U.S.S.Ct. Docket No. 15-5004. That petition squarely presents the question of whether the Eighth 
Amendment categorically bans JL WOP sentences. 
In this case, the imposition of two fixed life sentences categorically violate the Eighth 
Amendment. This Court should reverse the sentences and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with Miller. 
6. Alternatively, Miller requires a resentencing where the Miller factors are considered. 
At the sentencing hearing, Richard Worst, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified that he evaluated 
Sarah and found that she was believable. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6283, In. 19-20. He testified that Sarah is 
amenable to rehabilitation. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6289, In. 2-3. And he testified that he did not find 
66 
anything that would allow a prediction that Sarah would be prone to violence. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6289, 
11-14. 
Dr. Worst also testified as to the development of the adolescent brain and why the 
American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American 
Academy of Adolescent Medicine, and the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law have all 
taken a stance against the death penalty for juveniles based upon the scientific understanding of 
brain development over the lifespan. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6289, In. 19-p. 6292, In. 17. 
Finally, Dr. Worst testified that even though he looked very hard to find evidence that 
Sarah had conduct disorder, he could not find any substantial evidence to support that diagnosis. 
Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6294, In. 23-p. 6295, In. 6. 
Craig Beaver, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist, testified at the sentencing hearing that he 
evaluated Sarah. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6367, In. 16-p. 6368, In. 7. He testified to the current state of the 
scientific understanding of brain development and that the development of the areas of the brain 
associated with high-level decision making, organization, problem solving, inhibitory control, and 
higher-level adult reasoning and functioning do not fully develop until sometime in the mid-
twenties. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6370, In. 3-p. 6371, In. 10. 
Dr. Beaver testified that Sarah has rehabilitative potential, citing to the facts that Sarah 
does not have a mental health disorder, does not have a drug or alcohol dependency problem, is of 
average intelligence, and did not have a prior history of violence in support of the conclusion that 
she can eventually be successful in the community. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6399, In. 4-22. The testing done 
on Sarah does not indicate that she is a sociopath. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6400, In. 18-p. 6401, In. 3. In 
general, the research indicates that peopie who have killed a parent have a very low recidivism 
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rate compared to other people who go to prison. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6400, In. 1-7. Specifically, Dr. 
Beaver testified that in his opinion, Sarah is not a substantial risk to reoffend. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6413, 
In. 5-p. 6515, In. 8. 
In imposing the two fixed life sentences, the District Court made only the following 
observations regarding Sarah's age (16) at the time of the offenses: 
1. "Pai1 of the notion here, to me at least, is that society cannot tolerate and will not 
tolerate a child rebelling against parents and killing them, the very people who in this 
circumstance were trying to protect you. And, clearly, absent any justification or excuse. That's 
precisely what happened here." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6469, In. 22-p. 6470, In. 3. 
2. "While I recognize that some of the psychological evidence presented here at this 
sentencing hearing was to the effect that adolescents can act impulsively, the evidence in this case 
is not impulsive evidence." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6473, In. 9-13. 
3. "Another way for me to look at it is to do what I call a T account. ... And on the 
mitigating side, there is in fact your age. At the time you committed these crimes, you were 16 
years of age." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6477, ln. 12-20. 
4. "I think Dr. Worst is right in the sense that you have this distorted view of yourself and 
reality, and the truth escapes you, frankly. And I don't think it's a product of your age. I just 
think it's a product of your makeup that you find the fact of being truthful difficult to get a hold 
of." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6489, In. 15-20. 
5. "As to Dr. Beaver's testimony about children, what I would respond is children 
normally don't act the way you act. You had many options to do many different things, and you 
chose to do what you did." Tr. Voi. 9, p. 6492, In. 13-17. 
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6. "And then the state brought up this question about your age, and made the comment 
that you had already received the benefit of your age: and you had already received the benefit of 
your age because the state had not sought the death penalty. And of course, the United States 
Supreme Court has ruled that this is not a death penalty case. I understand it's not a death penalty 
case. It's never been a death penalty case." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6492, In. 25-p. 6493, ln. 8. 
7. Following this statement, the Court reviewed the case, "pretending" it was a death 
penalty case to guide its discretion. Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6493, In. 18-p. 6497, ln. 12. The Court 
concluded this analysis by stating, "So if, hypothetically, if this were a death penalty case, you 
would be a candidate for it; and that's the purpose of this exercise." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6497, ln. 13-15. 
8. "As to general deterrence, this -- the community and people in this state have to 
understand, and the kids in this state have to understand the first time they get grounded by -
when they get grounded by their parents, I shouldn't say the first, when they get grounded by their 
parents when they refuse to follow family rules, when the parents are simply trying to protect 
them from an improper, illegal relationship, kids can't just go kill parents. We would have 
absolute disarray in our society if that was sanctioned behavior." Tr. Vol. 9, p. 6499, ln. 18-p. 
6500, In. 3. 
Applying Roper, Graham and Miller to this case, an Eighth Amendment violation exists. 
First, the District Court did not take into account Sarah's status as a juvenile as a mitigating factor 
in sentencing her. The Court rejected all the defense evidence presented regarding Sarah's youth -
dismissing both Dr. Beaver and Dr. Worst's testimony regarding brain development and Sarah's 
potential for rehabilitation and low likelihood of reoffense. Instead of considering that Sarah's 
youth made her less culpable than an adult, that she was more vuinerabie to negative influences 
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and outside pressures, and that her character not as well formed and less fixed than an adult· s. the 
Court held Sarah's youth against her. 
The District Court did exactly what the Supreme Court cautioned against and forbade; it 
allowed the nature of the crime to overpower the mitigation arguments based on youth. The Court 
determined that Sarah was more deserving of the harshest possible penalty because she was a 
child and because the Court found that children killing parents cannot be tolerated and social 
chaos might result from a lesser penalty. Had Sarah been an adult who killed her parents, the 
Court would have, by its reasoning, given her a lesser sentence because adult children who kill 
their parents do not threaten the social fabric as seriously as juveniles who kill their parents do. 
This failure to properly consider Sarah's youth violated Miller and the Eighth Amendment. 
Miller was also violated because this case does not present the unusual circumstances 
which would allow such a penalty. While the offense of conviction was violent, Sarah had no 
prior record of violence. There was substantial evidence that Sarah was amenable to 
rehabilitation. There was no evidence that she would forever be a danger to society. In fact, two 
experts testified that she was unlikely to reoffend and likely could eventually be safety released 
into the community. She is not the rare case envisioned by Miller. 
Miller considered the legitimate penologieal justifications for imposing the harshest 
sentence possible, life without possibility of parole, on juveniles and determined that the sentence 
cannot be justified on the basis of retribution because retribution relates to blameworthiness and 
the case for blameworthiness and thus retribution is not as strong with children as with adults. 
The Court further found that the sentence cannot be justified by deterrence because the same 
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults, including immaturity, recklessness, 
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and impetuosity, make them less likely to consider potential punishment. And, incapacitation 
cannot justify the sentence except where a finding can be made that the child will forever be a 
danger to society - a finding that "is inconsistent with youth." (In particular, that finding is 
inconsistent with youth in this case because both Dr. Beaver and Dr. Worst testified that Sarah 
cannot be said to be incorrigible.) And, lastly, the sentence cannot be justified on the basis of 
rehabilitation because the sentence imposed disregards the possibility of rehabilitation. 132 S. Ct. 
at 2465- 2469. 
In this case, the imposition of two fixed life sentences cannot be reconciled with the 
Eighth Amendment. The sentences cannot be justified by retribution, deterrence, incapacity, or 
rehabilitation. This Court should vacate the sentences and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with Miller. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, this Court should reverse the order denying Sarah's request to have 
evidence DNA tested. It should also vacate the JL WOP sentences and remand for resentencing in 
light of Miller. It should overrule Murphy v. State and remand claims 2-5 for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this / f i/,J. day of December, 2015. 
Attorneys for Sarah Johnson 
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